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ABSTRACT

Research literature on trustees and boards and their role in governance is reviewed. Four cases prepared in conjunction with this inquiry are presented that illustrate the critical role process plays in leading to wise decision-making. The pros and cons of academics on boards are examined and some tactics and strategies following these findings are presented and advanced as techniques boards might adopt to achieve their aims more effectively. Appended are Wade Ellis' guidelines for a presidential search. (SPG)

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RESEARCH ON GOVERNING BOARDS AND SOME PROBLEM SOLVING TACTICS AND STRATEGIES INVOLVING A PROFESSOR AS A TRUSTEE

by

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September 1977

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FOREWORD

I am indebted to Fred Bolman and Exxon for supporting the preparation, production, and distribution of this manuscript. The funds also allowed me to engage others who supplied chapters to an earlier version of this project. In addition, Fred Bolman has written a succinct and insightful Preface to this work. For all of these reasons, this work has been dependent upon his generosity.

The idea for this inquiry arose from a request from the president of a liberal arts college. He asked me to consider serving on the Board of his college. Among other reflections I went through, turning to colleagues of mine at The University of Michigan who were already serving in this capacity at other liberal arts colleges was the most fruitful.

Wade Ellis, Professor of Mathematics and Associate Dean, Rackham Graduate School; Howard McClusky, Professor of Continuing Education and Gerentology (emeritus); Wilbert McKeachie, Professor of Psychology and Director, Center for Research on Learning and Teaching; Theodore Newcomb, Professor of Social Psychology and Associate Director, Residential College (emeritus); and Marvin Peterson, Professor and Director, Center for the Study of Higher Education, each wrote chapters from their experience.* Their individual case studies constitute a substantial body of evidence which is called upon to support the position taken here. Additional appreciation is extended to Marvin Peterson for his critique of this manuscript.

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* The individuals just named by no means exhaust the roster of Michigan faculty who are serving in the capacity of Board members for colleges and universities.

PREFACE

Should faculty serve as trustees of colleges and universities? Of the institution which employs them? Of other institutions of similar character? These are issues addressed by this monograph and by professors who serve as trustees of institutions not employing them.

Of course, the faculty and students are the institution. They are--hopefully--what happens in the universe of higher learning. But there is a board of trustees. What are its responsibilities and functions? Historically? Today? Tomorrow? No university or college has had or ever will have the final answer; nor does this slender volume presume such. What the monograph does do is to explore some of the issues today, and suggest pathways to discovery of some answers. The reportage of faculty trusteeship is valuable, and here we have a first anthology of such viewpoints.

I think back to 1825 when President Kirkland of Harvard College tried to "set" the curriculum. The faculty instituted legal proceedings in the Commonwealth to prove that the word "Fellow"--a majority of the governing Corporation--was of English descent and that meant in the 17th Century a full-time tutor at the institution. Before the court the faculty at Harvard lost in their final attempt to take control of the college, which cemented the practice of having lay boards of trustees in American higher education. But, incidentally, Harvard's faculty then won control of the curriculum--also a pattern for others ever since.

Some years ago the Vice Principal of the University of Melbourne and I had a long talk. He was concluding a few months in this country on an Eisenhower Fellowship to study higher education. By chance he said that at his institution both faculty and students of the university served on the governing board, by election of their respective peers, and had done so for many years. Asked how it worked, he replied: not at all. Asked why, he said he now knew enough of our culture to say, if such elected members were good at boardsmanship, they quickly became "Uncle Toms". They lost their representational, constituency character. There may be hidden virtues here that my friend and I did not pursue.

But faculty from other institutions on college boards? Hardly a new--but also not a widespread--idea. By careful contrivance, one illustrious New England college even found its next president that way. They selected a budding scholar of a nearby prestigious university as a trustee, carefully rotated him among important committees of the Board, then made him president.

Henry Wriston, former president of Brown University, was fond of saying that a trustee should possess at least two if not three virtues: wealth, work, and wisdom. When I mentioned this to a member of one of the several boards of trustees I have served, a sly memo from that trustee came to me:

> There once was a trustee named Hubble Hughs,
> Who always had trouble with W's.
> At work, he was lazy,
> In wisdom, quite hazy --
> And brokers kept bringing him trouble-news.

For the new era discussed in this volume, the new trustee must first and foremost have analytic capability to a high degree. By profession he may not be an operations or systems analyst, but whatever his occupation he must have skills of that order. Be he doctor, lawyer, merchant, chief, he must have the quality of mind and ability to see the present whole, dissect and reconstruct. This <u>is</u> a new day in trusteeship.

Then, too, he must have insights into societal needs as they change and into institutional possibilities for response. All issues he confronts as trustee bear upon national and regional trained manpower needs. His task as trustee is to help analyze his institution's resource allocation management problems to help meet those needs. Our use of the word "societal needs" here must not obliterate obedience to "individual needs". Education for a career must tend to the careerist as well as to his or her milieu.

Finally, the new trustee must be involved in board structure and function. He must be concerned about the rational authority structure of the board, a training ground for future leadership on the board. And he must be concerned with rational process--which includes involving all constituencies; meaning administration, faculty, students, alumni, geographic locale, etc. These abilities and responsibilities are hardly different from those needed to serve on the board of a large corporation or of a state or national governmental commission. A college board member must display equal ability, concern, and effort.

This monograph was written because a few professors serve on liberal arts college boards of trustees. Who should read it? Surely all trustees of colleges and universities--approximately 45,000 persons--also many of our nearly 500,000 faculty of higher education. Probably also those in state and local governments concerned with the governance of higher education.

The point is that trusteeship in higher education is a vital issue concerning many people. The legal framework probably is durable, and, if so, trusteeship has an utmost claim on our attention.

Frederick deW. Bolman
Executive Director
Exxon Education Foundation

New York, New York

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INTRODUCTION

College and university governance and leadership are not new problems in higher education. Quite the opposite, in fact; they are the persisting ones, waxing and waning from time to time but just as certain to peak again after a decline as is the flood tide to follow the ebb. As the public guardians of our colleges and universities, trustees man the boundary between those from without who seek to dictate the policy and control the practice of those within, and the students and faculty who wonder if there will be a continuation of their programs and careers, whether anyone in the larger society endorses their goals and supports their efforts.

At the same time that the Board serves to protect the college from without and to insure its healthy continuance, members are still recovering from direct attacks on them by internal constituencies. Only yesterday students and faculty expressed dismay at Board insensitivity to social problems. They sought membership on Boards as a device for directing the activities of their institution. Quite irrespective of the immediate outcome of these pressures on Boards, fundamental questions were raised about governance and leadership, questions which should improve the life of all parties when properly responded to.

What Board composition and what procedures for governing a college will best serve the institution's missions of teaching students, preserving and generating knowledge, and public service? That basic question led to this monograph for it served to direct a research review and to have case histories prepared by experienced participants. Simultaneously, attention was directed to the question of whether or not an academic person on the Board (not an unpracticed situation, but an infrequent one) would increase the effectiveness of the Board.

Outstanding citizens continue to respond to a call to serve on Boards of Trustees.[1] These people give their time and their counsel. Frequently, they also give money, for trustees belong to exclusive organizations. It costs to belong to a Board.

Until recently, the accepted practice had been that trustees were not to form an intimate relationship with their college. It had been understood that trustees, while legally responsible and sin-

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[1] Regents, Overseers, Governing Boards, and other related terms will be used interchangeably.

cerely concerned for their college, were not really to be very involved. They were to know what was going on about campus, but from an arm's length perspective. Their job was to select a president, and then delegate to him as much of their authority and responsibility as possible.

As a natural consequence, trustees remained effectively invisible to the inhabitants of their colleges. They appear in print on a page in the catalogue. Possibly the chairman of the Board parades on the platform at graduation or at other ceremonial functions. It is not that trustees didn't care about their college. Just the opposite, in fact. But to get too close exposed them to charges of interference, of meddling, of managing rather than setting policy. All agreed, then, the proper stance was the distant one.

Not so today.

Late 1960 events activated Board member participation in the deliberations of their college's affairs to a degree this generation had never experienced. Sit-ins, confrontations, demonstrations, and demands for this and that had Boards meeting more frequently than ever before. The trustee's need-to-know what was going on changed from a nonexpected ideal state to a fundamental necessity. If nothing else, presidential turnover increased at such a rate on some campuses that search committees almost became standing bodies in the Board organizational chart.

Now the problems have changed, even dramatically, but pressures on Board members to be more than token figureheads has not slackened. Even the nation's wealthiest colleges and universities are facing red ink end-of-the-year balances and with no visible signs of new or increased financial support on the horizon. Costs are soaring for energy and insurance, to mention but two uncontrollable expenses. Supportive personnel are now receiving wages of the order of magnitude others in their occupations earn, at a cost colleges had not spent in the not too distant past. Inflation takes a particularly heavy toll in colleges where income for a year is budgeted well in advance of a predictable increase in expenses. More than one college has righted the wrongs of underpaid women employees, but the money comes from the operating budget. Retrenchment, or sometimes the more euphemistic phrase, "steady state" is a common word at the Board table today, expressing a state of mind that is the polar opposite of the spirit of unlimited growth, expansion, and fairly generous resources that pervaded the campus less than a decade ago when Boards were far less sanguine about the operations of their colleges.

Another set of phenomena requiring increased trustee activity

arises from the fact that colleges are no longer secluded ivy towers but rather are a social institution interacting with all parts of society. Linkages with other colleges, "voluntary" participation with State Boards of Higher Education, dependency upon State and Federal monies in a wide variety of forms, Affirmative Action, HEW and quotas and goals, attorney general rulings regarding the eligibility of students to sit on Boards, legal suits with students, parents, faculty--and seemingly almost everyone--have also changed what was a simple, uncomplicated operation into a complex business. The need for specialized expertise extends beyond the institution's administrative staff and more frequently directly involves the Board.

(Another side of the external relationship coin exists in some public institutions located in states with strong centralized systems. In these instances, so much power has come into one office in the capitol that local Boards wonder why they exist at all. Their policy setting role, presidential selection function, and fiscal management--three of their most critical activities--have become essentially nonexistent. At the same time, like everyone else today, the Boards remain accountable, but to whom and for what are questions which perplex trustees in this situation of minimal autonomy.)

Also, the new era of postsecondary education and its broader spectrum of institutions other than the standard college and university has introduced novel issues requiring Board knowledge and participation. Many colleges are working with "new" (nontraditional) students, persons who in the past had not gone to college. Frequently these are older people, working successfully on jobs. Awarding them credit for experiences they had had, giving them recognition for skills they have acquired outside of the colleges, taking education to them rather than having them in residence on campus, permitting them to take five or more years to complete a degree, and a wide-range of phenomena run counter to the traditional image of the residential liberal arts college and all of its accoutrements. For private liberal arts colleges which court this new clientele, a fundamental change confronts alumni (as well as faculty, students, and administrators within) and hence Board members. A basic change in the goals and mission of their college, the one they hold in trust, may be at stake.

In addition, some industrial practices from the private sector have found their way into the running of colleges and universities. For example, collective bargaining is growing in higher education--among service personnel and faculty, even among middle management administrators who also want to protect their share of a shrinking pie. It is not that many Board members are unfamiliar with conflict and strikes, for most have come from the business world (although most

probably never thought such a governance system would emerge in a college, especially their alma mater), but in the case of faculty collective bargaining, the college's top administrative echelon is bypassed. Bargaining is directly with the Board, or better, with their appointed representatives. This new tactic for establishing institutional policy and establishing working conditions also has increased trustee involvement.

Faculty matters also receive an increased share of Board time because of other new events. In the 1960's, recruitment and turnover of faculty might have been mentioned by the president as a serious problem he was facing, but the Board did not enter the arena. Now, however, faculty efforts to retain their positions have become a matter of trustee involvement. Today's faculty is a nervous one, uncertain about the future and the careers for which they spent thirty years preparing. Jobs elsewhere are few and competition for them intense. Mobility and turnover approach a low probably not matched since the 1930's. Tenure, a faculty practice of dubious merit to many Board members but a practice which did not overly disturb them in the past, has now become a debatable issue and alternatives are being sought which would limit the number of faculty who can acquire that status. Job sinecure, retrenchment, a president's remarks about inability to change the college because of a faculty fixed in its ways--that is, a nearly fully tenured faculty--seems to heighten the tensions rather than to resolve the problems of the moment. (As will be argued below, the case for an academic person on a Board is strengthened today because of the many matters requiring Board action that relate to faculty.)

Put all of the above together with the public's loss of enchantment with higher education in general and a loss of confidence in particular instances and one has a set of people--trustees--very much in need of knowledge and skills many have not acquired nor ever thought they would have to possess.

These new pressures on trustees and their concomitant governance issues naturally raise questions with regard to Board processes and structures. Sometimes students have demanded membership, and so have faculty, although professors seemingly have been less vociferous. Most often the arguments which have been advanced rest on a constituency representation basis and/or the principle of those who are affected by decisions have a right to participate in the decisions.

This monograph examines this argument and, in the main, rejects the constituercy concept as neither a sound position nor a means of significantly improving governance. However, an argument is advanced for college and university governing bodies to have a professor as a trustee, on the basis of cases prepared by some academics who are now

serving on Boards of colleges (other than their own) and on examination of the roles an academic can fill if on a Board.

However, before assessing particular pros and cons of having an academic person on the Board,[2] the evidence which does exist first needs to be assayed. While research on trustees and Boards is not extensive, especially in contrast to the essayistic pieces which abound, there is more documented evidence than many believe exist.

This monograph, then, first reviews the research literature on trustees and Boards and their role in governance. The literature review also includes the better analytical pieces as well as those which contain data. However, it does not recite opinion pieces, even the excellent ones. The manuscript next focuses on four cases that were prepared in conjunction with this inquiry. The monograph concludes with an examination of the pros and cons of academics on Boards. It also includes some tactics and strategies which follow from these findings and advances them as techniques Boards might adopt to more effectively achieve their aims. Included are Wade Ellis' guidelines for a presidential search located in Appendix A.

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[2] Both the case of a professor from within the college and also a professor from another institution will be considered. The conclusion, argued and supported within the monograph, is that the professor from within arrangement has serious limitations whereas an academic person from without can make significant contributions to the Board.

CHAPTER I

TRUSTEES AND BOARDS

Historical Background

Lay Boards characterize American colleges. However, the practice was not instituted because a clear set of philosophical principles led to the conclusion that higher education institutions would be better if lay rather than professional persons held ultimate authority. Rather a host of unplanned and essentially "accidental" factors combined to proudce the arrangements we have today (Brubacher and Rudy, 1968; Hull and Shapiro, 1973).

The post-Renaissance European model of the masters (faculty) controlling the college was modified in England when that country instituted church and state control. The external control model dominated this country's first colleges as they sought charters from the King of England. Since the early United States colleges had the preparation of clergy as a principal mission, it it not surprising that control outside of the faculty dominated. The arrangements varied, however. Harvard, for example, had dual controls--an external Board of Overseers and an internal Board of Governors.

The Revolution introduced new complications. Colleges asked newly formed states for support. The states, in turn, sought control. Consequently a weak faculty lost whatever tenuous say they earlier had as to how the college was to be governed. The land grant movement and the spread of public higher education removed the last vestiges of faculty having any ownership of their organization, an outcome which provides an interesting contradiction to the democratic principle this country proudly champions with respect to all of its other corporations, especially in the private sector of postsecondary education.

The involved sequence of events just briefly described has produced legal entities which are uniquely continental U.S.A.--lay boards which operate with complete powers and without the nation's valued principle of checks and balances. In practice, but not by legal force, the Board delegates its managerial responsibilities to a president it elects. The Board lodges authority in the hands of this one individual. Still, faculty influence has reemerged in this century. However, it is influence, not control, that professors possess. Their power nowhere approaches their earlier state of complete responsibility.

One other historical trend needs to be introduced. As time passed, Boards were cajoled by experts, increasingly to delegate their unlimited authority and were lectured not to interfere with the internal operations. By the 1950's and 1960's, the message to a trustee clearly was: "Don't meddle. Be sure the college is run well. Discharge the president if you don't think it is. But while he is on the job, keep hands off". This isolation from the campus and its students and faculty was the tradition which trustees practiced as college after college erupted before their eyes but a scant few years ago.

(As will be seen, the strong emphasis on "hands off" swung the pendulum too far. It permitted Board members to justify their ignorance of what was going on in colleges and universities. It provided ready made excuses for poor decisions. The hands-off policy and practice smoothed the way for confrontations to become conflagrations when those who held ultimate authority displayed gross ignorance.)

As Rauh (1959:18) contends, such a Board stance is not really possible. The line between policy-making and administrative action is always a fine one and frequently is a shifting one, especially as societal pressures fluctuate. The matter of setting wise policy while remaining ignorant of local events and national trends is an internal contradiction. Nonetheless, this brief historical examination of accommodation to changing times and the strain to distinguish control (Board) from management (president) functions suggests a minimum set of Board responsibilities. Rauh's analysis shows four duties Boards can perform better than any other agency:

1. To fill vacancies and make changes in the Office of the President. In this function the Board oversees the basic purpose of the institution.

2. To hold title to and conserve the property. The Board thus serves the financial well-being of the institution.

3. To act as a court of last resort.

4. To hold the charter and seek revision of it when it is deemed necessary (1959: 19).

Today's rapidly changing events show how even one of these four functions now is under question and possible revision. The notion of "court of last resort" assumes an autonomy and exclusion from civil action that recent court cases call seriously into question. More than due process and civil rights are involved; continuous employment, the right to succeed, and other heretofore uncontested issues now move right past Boards and land in the civil courts.

This historical development of the relationship of trustees to colleges quite naturally has led to a set of practices and beliefs that characterize much of higher education. Before turning to the research findings on Boards and trustees, some of these beliefs are presented as a way of summarizing the historical trends.

Some Beliefs About Boards

Some assertions frequently attributed to trustees and Boards even can be called myths, not because they are believed to be true but are in actuality false but simply because they represent statements of belief generally attributed to trustees. Like old wives' tales, some have a high degree of truth whereas others have a questionable basis in reality.

Belief 1.

As a Board, we are the legal representatives of a charter. Our primary responsibility is to protect and control, not to motivate and stimulate. We maintain what is. Like church and corporation Boards, our job is to hire the best manager we can find, turn the organization over to her or him, periodically inspect the books, reward for a performance record in accord with the goals of the organization, and remove those who fail to manage well. This is the way it is in the real world. Colleges are no different, and if per chance they are, that is a part of their trouble. They need strong top management. Like any effective organization, the top spot is the key spot. All feeds down from the top.

Belief 2.

As a corollary, there are clear expectations for the proper behavior of faculty and students. For example, loyalty to the college is a prime attribute. Students who petition or demonstrate for a change of rules or who call into question longstanding college positions--for instance, intervisitation in the residence halls or money spent on intercollegiate football--lack our college's true spirit and should go elsewhere. Faculty who criticize the college for its failure to allow a significant professorial voice in the selection of administrators demonstrate questionable loyalty and ought to be let go.

Furthermore, should disputes over issues become severe and lead to interruptions of regularly scheduled events, then genuine harm has been done. Disgrace has fallen on the college and on the management

for permitting it. (Heaven help the president who tolerates disruptions.) Disagreements are dysfunctional. They interfere with the educational aims of the college. Good rarely results from conflict.

Belief 3.

The liberal arts are why colleges exist, especially ours. Vocations are important, too, for certainly a career in business is highly admirable. But the best way to prepare for a professional occupation is to have a sound liberal arts education. Furthermore, a liberal arts education means solid classroom work in the basic subjects--English, history, science. Off-campus experiences have a value, but they are extramural, as are choir and drama and sports. Also, examinations alone cannot really ascertain a liberal arts education. Credit by examination might be all right for a very precise skill, like mathematics, but a liberal education is a professor and students together in a classroom. There really are not genuine alternatives to a true liberal arts education.

Belief 4.

Similarly, the campus is the key to why the college exists. The campus is the core. If there is not a campus, then there is not a liberal arts college. Universities without walls and similar diffuse educational agencies may serve a population who otherwise does not have access to a campus--and it is important that everyone who can benefit be served; however, people in such arrangements are really not in college and are getting short-changed--academically, socially, and personally. They are not receiving what matters most of all, namely, that which only the campus can provide.

Belief 5.

Two corollaries follow from Belief 4:

a) While higher education is to be available to all who wish and can profit from it, attending our college is a privilege, not a right. Every person should have access to some college, but we have the right to select only those we wish, those who share our goals, and those who recognize the distinctiveness of our offerings.

b) It may be financially desirable to join with other colleges in a consortium of some kind, perhaps to benefit from reduced

insurance rates by virtue of a larger membership or to share in a traveling concert or lecture series. However, to form binding relationships with other colleges is unnatural and unnecessary. This is true even with colleges of the same type and caliber. It makes no sense to consort with institutions of other kinds, especially with those which are less selective. After all, colleges are distinct and what makes them distinctive is their autonomy and their full control over their destiny. Formal interrelationships dilute and drain resources. There is no reciprocal return to compensate for what is lost. Besides, consortia usually cost more money than they save.

Belief 6.

Yes, we as a Board and a College have some problems. There is even a genuine danger that some are beyond our control--federal aid, a deteriorating neighborhood, a geographical isolation for a youth population that wants city lights. However, our problems are unique. If they are solvable, we can solve them. We are a collection of talented people. If anyone can find a remedy, we can. Outsiders will not really understand us. Soliciting external aid is a waste of time and money.

Other assertions can be made about how Boards are said to believe and act, but the above touch most of what matters very much when analyses of decision making enter. Moreover, these half dozen stances are not beliefs unique to Boards. Presidents, faculty, and students do not necessarily believe otherwise. Constituencies may differ on some issues (for example, who has the right to set what policies), but they will be in agreement on others (attending our college is a privilege, not a right).

The truth of these and other beliefs, their tenability and effectiveness, and the consequences they have for the good health of our colleges will receive further discussion later in the monograph. Now it is time to inspect what research findings reveal about Boards and trustees.

Some Facts[3] About Boards

The studies of governing Boards have been predominantly descriptive. In the main, they have collected information on trustee composition and structure, on effort given to different activities, and on preferences and attitudes about topical issues. Even though such surveys about Boards are unanchored in theory and lacking in hypothesis testing, they nonetheless form an important data base upon which more sophisticated research can be launched. As a skeleton they lack life. They are, however, the place to begin. They are a necessary first step for they provide the gross anatomy of a Board of Trustees.

To begin, a number of studies contain important demographic and attitudinal data that need to be considered. Griffin (1963) surveyed and interviewed trustees and presidents from 39 liberal arts colleges related to the United Presbyterian Church. Hulbert (1972) looked at Board functions in New York's secular colleges and universities. Herron (1969) also restricted his survey to small private liberal arts colleges, those which are members of the Council for the Advancement of Small Colleges (CASC). Nabrit (1970) looked at leadership and Williams (1975) examined compositions in historically Black institutions. Fisher (1969) included colleges and universities in North Carolina, public as well as private. Massey (1969) mixed types of institutions and type of control within the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools and focused primarily on the president's relationship to the Board. Sapper (1966) confined his study to the public junior colleges of California, Hornbach (1968) to public institutions, McDonald (1971) to three four-year institutions in Colorado, and Godfrey (1971) to contrasting female with male trustees in public colleges and universities. Rauh's (1969) national survey of 5,000 of 45,000 trustees from 500 of the 2500 colleges and universities of all types and both Nelson & Turk's (1973) and Davis & Batchelor's (1974) national surveys for Nason's (1974) monograph round out the descriptive picture presented.

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[3] There are a number of documents which speak to trustee and board concerns, state basic principles, and provide important and valuable information (other than research). Among these are: Hughes (1951), Morrison (1959), Wicke (1962; 1969), Martorana (1963), Burns (1966), Henderson (1967), Zwingle (1970a; 1970b), Nason (1974), and Zwingle and Mayville (1974). In addition, Harvey (1971) provides a good general literature review, as do Russock (1974) and ERIC (1975) for two-year colleges.

While what these studies on Boards reveal are important, some cautions are necessary. The studies tend to report averages without fully depicting the degree of variation. For example, the studies show the average Board consists of twenty members. However, for all practical purposes, that precise number represents a nonexistent Board. The figure, like some others, results from combining data from the private and public sectors when it is important to keep them separate in many instances. Here the number twenty is the artifact of the arithmetic averaging the typical 27-member Board size of private liberal arts colleges (excepting Catholic colleges which frequently have about five members) with the public college typical Board size of nine. (Community colleges [public] have an even lower number, seven on the average.) Public and private colleges also differ on the matter of trustee selection and length of term. While considerable variation exists in both instances, a principal difference in the two sectors of higher education is the self-perpetuating and indefinite tenure of private college trustees versus the election or political appointment for fixed terms in the public sector. Another important distinction between private and public colleges and universities is the typically closed Board meetings in the private sector versus the more frequently open meetings of Boards of public institutions.

Despite wide variation in selection process, size, and composition, Board organization and functioning -- as well as in the problems faced -- both privately and publicly controlled Boards are remarkably alike. For example, committees are used, with the Executive Committee being the key unit. Also, the first function is identical for Boards in both sectors: select the best president available. Furthermore, irrespective of institutional type and control, Board activities predominantly are devoted to finance and plant management, not to educational policy or mission. Dollars dominate the agenda.

From this descriptive and global overview, provided by the studies just cited, more specific dimensions are examined--legal history, changing social background of trustees, roles and functions of Boards (who should do what), Board Chairperson and College President leadership, institutional goal agreements between Boards and administrators, faculty, students, and the principal conflict area, namely, governance, or, in other terms, decision making.

Legal Matters

Steinzor (1963) and Roberts (1964) independently explored the complex questions of the effects of state and federal court decisions on Boards and the extent to which Boards have retained their legal responsibilities to direct colleges and universities. Court decisions

and new legislation have not always resolved ambiguities; indeed, at times they have introduced new uncertainties and triggered conflict. For example, constitutional autonomy of some universities can clash with requests from state agencies. Also, a request for funds which dictate their expenditure contests a college's right to manage its own affairs. Also, the need for regional accreditation in order to qualify for federal funds raises serious questions about the voluntary association of accrediting agencies. Losing accreditation is no longer a purely academic matter and has led to court suits. Steinzor and Roberts help explain the current state of affairs. Unfortunately, the two studies frequently are unable to solve the specific legal problems facing a given institution. The courts have not been that consistent.

Moreover, recent events indicate that uncertainties and litigation will increase, not lessen. Nelson and Turk's (1973) survey revealed that over 60 percent of public four-year colleges had had a law suit filed against them within the last five years (most frequently by faculty on matters of tenure and conditions of employment). A concomitant of the civil rights movement, one involving more than the very important securing of the rights of repressed and unfairly treated peoples, is the increased call on the law for redress of grievances of all kinds, perceived as well as real. Bodies heretofore immune from civil action are particularly caught in increased suits and litigation. Colleges are such organizations.

It will be some time before a clear code of right and wrong practice emerges, if ever. Colleges had best prepare for heightened activity in the legal arena. Furthermore, they will better accomplish their goals if they institute a realistic approach to legal confrontations. To avow to defend the past at all costs is the all too frequent and unhealthy response to a law suit. The "if you don't love it, leave it" reply to an individual seeking redress of a grievance solves nothing. As good as our colleges and universities have been, and they probably are society's most humane institutions, they are not perfect and are not the Utopias they should strive to become. A positive approach to issues, say, affirmative action mandates from HEW and the right to organize and strike--high anathemas for many Boards--can move the college forward when dealt with as problems to be solved rather than as unchangeable principles.

Social Backgrounds

Knowing the social background of trustees, and how they are changing over time, assists in understanding some Board positions and decisions. Hamilton's (1966) study contrasted Board composition in the 1960's with trustee backgrounds in the 1930's. She learned that while the privileged classes still dominate Board membership,

there have been significant shifts away from the social elite toward the managerial and professional social classes. That is, in the 1930's, the majority of Board members came from the social registers, from the wealthy families of long standing reputation. This American royalty no longer dominates Board membership. Today most trustees come from the wealthy, executive elite, the managers (not owners) of business and industry, persons accustomed to organizational and bureaucratic hierarchies. This is not to say that the former are incapable of dealing with today's important questions. Rather, those now in control are more immediately involved with the critical questions of economic viability. Many come from highly responsible positions where their organization's survival is contingent upon flexibility and adaptation. To change does not involve the same kind of trauma as it does for those who have had stability and tradition all their lives. Rather, the new trustees often view change as a key to healthy maintenance. Change is reality, the order of the day. Such Boards are going to be more responsible to new ideas and less restrictively bound to the past. Such traits as openness appear highly essential for uncertain futures. So, even though legal matters expand and create more trustee related issues, Boards new have a mix of persons better equipped to deal with their contested authority and increased responsibilities than was true when the absentee trustee was the accepted mode.

Roles and Functions

Even though there had been changes in the nature of a college's problems and in the background and experiences of those charged to deal with them, still differences of opinion and disputes are to be expected about proper roles and functions of Boards vis a vis presidents, faculty, students, alumni, and the public. In fact, several studies document the general assertions that some conflict exists between the college's various constituencies. The research has encompassed all of higher education (Burns, 1962) and also has concentrated on special types of colleges (Keener, 1969, on private liberal arts colleges; Langan, 1968, on Catholic colleges and universities; Upton, 1969; Falk, 1970; Preus, 1970; and Prisco, 1971 on community colleges). The typical research in this area ascertains the degree of agreement between trustees, the president (as the representative of the administrators), faculty, and sometimes students on the proper roles and functions of each constituency. The investigator asks members of the different groups to respond to a number of current issues, (both actual and hypothetical) which cover the entire gamut of higher education--from policy making and fund raising through collective negotiation and who should participate in what kind of a decision.

In weighing the collective research, the number, kind, and de-

gree of disagreements between constituencies are not nearly as extreme as the popular and more sensational literature would have one believe, especially when it is recognized that most of the research was specifically designed with the aim of finding differences of opinion. Overall, consensus between principal constituencies is quite high on matters of policy setting, authority, and finance. For example, in a liberal arts college study (Keener, 1969), Boards and administrators agreed on 60 of 68 issues posed, a high degree of agreement.

This is not to say that there are no areas of dispute and that the differences are less important than the agreements. Who should decide what--institutional governance, that is--and matters of participation and extent of jurisdiction top the list of disagreements. For those within the college, decision making power is a prime issue, not a minor one. In general, the studies show that Boards think they should decide internal matters, like curriculum changes, an area faculty feel is their exclusive domain. When Boards and presidents disagree on who has the final say, and they sometimes do, the president's position usually is closer to the faculty's and student's than it is to the trustees'.

In addition to disputes regarding decision making, greatest differences--and confusion--exist as to the proper roles and function of the president when collective negotiations are involved. Perhaps this outcome is not a surprising finding because of the comparative newness of this phenomenon in higher education. Nonetheless, the uncertainty of whether the president is to be the Board's spokesperson, to serve as a mediator, or to have no role persists. Each alternative is seen to erode the educational leadership of the president, an undesired outcome in the eyes of the Board and the president.

Leadership

Leadership is a vital function for the Chairperson of the Board and for the President. In this regard, Blanchard's (1967) study of leadership styles in twenty private liberal arts colleges is most helpful. Using Fielder's leadership model and an analysis of the degree of structure a Board has for task-oriented behavior, Blanchard demonstrated that Board chairpersons and presidents will be more successful when their styles are more human relations oriented than they are when they take direct controlling, managing, and directing actions. The permissive, considerate, diplomatic leader will be more effective in achieving Board cooperation, according to Blanchard's research. His findings are of special interest because the more successful leadership behavior is nearly the polar opposite of what

many trustees want in their president, viz., a person who will be decisive, firm, and aggressive--a real manager of the institution. (How well presidents can play both roles and switch for the two audiences and occasions is not known.[4])

Outside of private liberal arts colleges, however, and in more complex higher educational arrangements--for example, in an entire state college system--Odell (1967) found authority and leadership patterns to be highly intricate. When looking for the existence of three different leadership models--a professional model which emphasizes autonomy and respect for expertise, a bureaucratic model which stresses rules, directions, and efficiency, and a leadership model which focuses on integration and commitment of members--Odell discovered each to be in operation in the same organization. Different activities required different styles to run a large institution. Furthermore, Odell believes that optimum functioning of a complex system is dependent upon the interaction of the three styles rather than on the dominance of one form over the other two. Trustees in larger colleges and universities need to consider carefully whether a uniform, unalterable leadership pattern is what is really best for each of their goals.

Goal Agreement

With respect to goal agreement between Boards and other constituencies, Caffrey (1968) reports an American Council on Education survey conducted to ascertain predictions different groups held about the future of higher education. The American Council on Education sampled trustees, college and university administrators, faculty, and students on the probability and desirability of 35 events taking place during the next decade. The accuracy of the predictions themselves is not as important as is the opportunity to inspect the degree to which the different constituencies agree (and disagree) and give priority to alternative outcomes. Two general findings merit special attention: (1) the high degree of agreement between the diverse groups on goals; and (2) some special topics on which there is disagreement. For example, high goal agreement between all four constituencies can be seen in that each predicted both a greater proportion of students going on to college and student self-regulation replacing *in loco parentis* as

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[4] Interestingly, presidents told Cohen and March (1974) that trustees are not very central to their lives.

first and second in likelihood of happening in the 1970's, as well as in the desire that these predictions become reality.

On the other side, increased faculty participation in governance received differential desirability rankings. Faculty participation was of highest importance to professors (rank 1) but only 8th for administrators and 11th for trustees (out of 35). Similarly, while there was general agreement on what possible future events were least important, the specific desire for diffusion of authority from top administrators (implied, then, is that students and faculty would be the recipients and hence would gain in authority) was 28th most desirable (that is, 7th least and/or most undesirable) for administrators, 4th most undesirable in the opinion of trustees, but 13th and 16th most desirable for faculty and students, respectively. Relatively high priorities for students and faculty were judged to be highly undesirable outcomes by administrators and trustees.

When all 35 items were examined with respect to what events are most likely to happen in higher education during the 1970's and what it is that each group wishes will take place, the correlation between expectation and desire is only 0.14 for the faculty respondents, a very low figure. (The correlations attained significantly high values for trustees, administrators, and students.) Said another way, administrators and trustees find the unfolding of events in higher education much more to their liking than faculty do. When intercorrelations on desirability of events--that is, on goals--are calculated between constituencies, generally high agreement is found. The lowest agreements are found between trustees and students and between trustees and faculty (Caffrey, 1968:135).

The American Council on Education's finding high goal agreement -- and the notable exceptions -- were also found by Stead (1971) in a study in a state university. Stead had undergraduate and graduate students, faculty, administrators, and trustees respond to Gross and Grambsch's (1968) university goal inventory, an instrument which, like Caffrey's, gives both perceived and preferred priorities. For example, the value placed on academic freedom and quality performance receive top goal priorities for all groups, just as they did in Gross and Grambsch's national survey. (However, Stead found faculty dissonance--the difference between a current perceived goal of the university and their preference for the goal--to be the lowest of all groups, just the opposite finding from Caffrey's American Council survey. Neither individual advances an explanation of why faculty are at the extremes in their studies and why their particular outcome differs from the other. Possibly the single institution case (Stead) is what can explain the difference. One university, where faculty feel their institution is going in the directions they value

most, does not mean all, or even any, others are.)

Brennan (1969) conducted a goal study in a community college setting. A self designed questionnaire on aims and objectives of the college was given to Board members, administrators, and faculty. (Students were not subjects in his investigation.) High agreement obtained between the groups on what the goals should be. However, there was considerably less agreement on how well the goals were being achieved. Most differences occurred between faculty and Board members, fewest between trustees and administrators. The persistent trend revealed by the research was the desire of the faculty to have a more significant voice in the governance of the college than faculty believe they now possess.

Finally, with respect to research on goals, DeFiore (1971; 1972) studied only faculty and trustees but did so at four types of institutions--public junior (community) colleges, public universities, private universities, and selective private four-year liberal arts colleges. He found high agreement in all types of institutions between the two constituencies as to what it is trustees actually do and with the goals of higher education. However, real differences between the two groups once again arise in the decision-making and authority areas. For example, most trustees believe that faculty should not have major authority on the majority of the sixteen issues raised in the questionnaire. On the other hand, nearly three quarters of the faculty believe they should have decision-making power on all but three of the issues. The results are an appreciable difference of opinion on who should decide what.

Governance

Goals themselves, then, are not an issue. Changing goals may be. Certainly decision-making is an issue. Who will decide is what produces the greatest divergence of opinion. Furthermore, the discrepancy is consistently in the same direction. As related above, with the founding of universities in the middle ages, faculties were the masters of the corporation. By the end of the last century, the pendulum had swung its full course. Professors were completely powerless. The last fifty or so years show an increase in the domain of their authority. However, what power faculty now have comes to them exclusively by delegation, seldom by any legal right. In addition, not all agreed that faculty participation in decision-making was a good practice. As recently as 1960, several authorities on college and university governance contended that faculty lacked the expertise and the desire to participate in institutional governance. They should have little or no voice in decision-making was the opinion of many. For example, Corson

wrote:

> Faculty influence . . . in contributing to such decisions [on governance and educational policy] is limited by the lack of analytical data on which to base objective and considered decisions, the limited interest of many faculty in higher education, their tendency to think about and act upon specific courses or requirements rather than policies, and their primary concern with their individual subject-matter fields (1960:47).

Dodds speaks similarly:

> Faculties find the same difficulty in drawing the line between policy framing and administrative execution that trustees do. Too many individuals nourish the erroneous idea that the only way to keep control is to have a finger in every issue, to control the details and perhaps administer them as well (1962:99).

Not all authorities spoke to exclude faculty, however. For example, Henderson states "a typical weakness of administrators is to make important decisions of policy without full discussions with their faculties (1960:239)". Kerr wrote similarly (1963:23). The American Association of Higher Education Task Force on Governance uncovered the conflicts found in the research just reported. Their report states: "the main sources of discontent are the faculty's desire to participate in the determination of those policies that affect its professional status and performance (1967:1)". Not surprisingly, faculty do not concur with Corson and Dodds that their influence is best excluded. Consistently their greatest contention vis a vis trustees is over the issue of who decides what--who sets degree requirements, who selects deans, who . . .

Unfortunately, almost no research has been done on decision-making of trustees and hence the degree of faculty influence--informal rather than formal in almost every college. Brown (1971) studied voting records of university governing boards and focused on dissent voting patterns. The public records, however, display such an overwhelming concensus of trustees on decisions that despite an extensive analysis (14,290 motions and over 100,000 votes), little insight emerges. Paltridge et al (1973) have the other study on decision-making, in this instance an examination of patterns of nineteen Boards. Their findings, like Brown's, tend to show that dissent on issues, if it exists, remains behind-the-scenes, not in the public records where it can be

scrutinized.

Fisher (1968) found in private institutions in New York that while in general trustees felt they have been effective, they did believe themselves to be least (and even, not) effective in the educational, faculty, and curricular affairs areas. Fisher's finding supports the conflict DeFiore (1971) reported above for it suggests faculty discontent on what they believe to be their right, namely, to make decisions and the internal educational matters. The persistent outcomes on governance conflicts demonstrate the need to penetrate this complex arena with better research and intensive analysis. Before doing so, however, some facts about trustees are presented.

Some Facts About Trustees

A trustee stereotype exists, which is in itself a fact which complicates the presentation of research data on trustees, a condition Bean (1975) rightfully decries. For like all stereotypes, exceptions and individual differences become lost in the dominant image that is advanced. Furthermore, even when stereotypical traits are found, an erroneous inference is often implied, namely, that the common characteristic is related to the essential behavior. At the same time, some personal attributes do correlate with relevant behavior of some individuals and hence are important to be cognizant about.

Such is the case with trustees. They are a remarkably homogeneous group along a number of dimensions. Yet significant individual differences exist and burying diversity distorts the picture. Similarity of religious denomination, for example, or of political party, does not either produce or correlate perfectly with opinions and attitudes on what should happen on a college campus. Furthermore, the typical unanimous board vote does not guarantee unanimity of opinion of members. At the same time, it is important to display those personal features which characterize a large number of trustees.

Rauh's (1969) and Hartnett's (1969) national studies assure reliability in the data and serves as the principal sources for the findings reported here. Both Rauh and Hartnett frequently report their findings for several subgroups of colleges, usually by type (community college, four-year college, . . .) and also by selectivity, that is, by ability level of students and wealth of the institution. Here the collective or total figures are presented and additional ones given in those instances when differences between boards are appreciable.

Demographics

To begin, the typical trustee has an extraordinarily high regard and concern for his[5] college. He gives generously of his time, attends meetings with great regularity, and works diligently with his peers and the president. Cheit (1971) has eloquently documented the trustee's sincerity and devotion.

As for demographic information, less than five percent of all trustees are under 40 years old and about three quarters are over 50. In fact, more than a third are over 60. Also, the trustee is white (96+%), and Protestant (75%).

The exceptions are not surprising. The younger and black trustees, when they exist in proportions significantly different from the figures just indicated, are found in the public two- and four-year colleges--not in the private sector, not in the universities, and not in the highly selective institutions.

Catholics are likewise non-randomly distributed. In all, they constitute 17 percent of the trustee population. (Catholics are about 25 percent of the U.S. population.) However, that small 17 percent is atypical for any given college. The figure is 90 percent for Catholic colleges and universities. Moreover, Catholics are never more than 13 percent for any of the seven other college types and are as low as two percent in private liberal arts colleges outside Catholic control.

Jewish trustees also present a picture meriting comment. While the total of four percent is not appreciably different from national population figures and does not vary greatly between institutional categories (as did Catholics--and as do Protestants on boards of Catholic colleges, only 0.5%), the number is greatly under the percentage of faculty from Jewish families (about 10 percent nationally, and nearly twice that at prestigious universities) as well as the percentage of the national student population who come from Jewish families.

As for sex, the last of this group of traits, the male to female ratio is six to one, with only minor variations between college cate-

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[5] "His" is the proper adjective in this instance. As will be seen immediately below, males outnumber females six to one. Nearing (1971) found fewer than that -- less than three percent females. Certainly women hold equally high concerns.

gories. The female percentage, of course, differs greatly from the student population (which is about 45 to 55, female to male). It does not, however, vary appreciably from the male to female faculty ratio.[6]

Summarizing thus far, then, the older, white, Protestant male dominates board membership by an overwhelming majority. The question of whether or not the younger and/or blacks and/or women hold different views than the "establishment" already has an affirmative documentation by Hartnett (1970). The "new trustee", as Hartnett calls them, favors greater student participation in decision-making and is more concerned about education of the disadvantaged, for example, than are the typical Board members.

Some other personal data shade in the sketch and have important consequences. For example, the trustee is well educated. Only about three percent have not attended college and almost 90 percent have at least a bachelor's degree. In fact, nearly 60 percent have attended graduate school and 50 percent have either a masters, a three-year professional degree (law, for example), or a doctorate (11%).

This extensive education, distinctively greater than the population as a whole, however, does not include much past or current reading about higher education. Over half of the surveyed trustees had never heard of the leading books and periodicals dealing with problems of colleges and universities (including magazines dealing specifically with trustees and college management and business) and only about 10 percent had read even a part of any one of them.

With regard to affluence, the typical trustee possesses extraordinary wealth. The modal annual income is in the $50-100,000 bracket. At the selective private schools, 43 percent of the trustees exceed the $100,000 income figure. The typical public junior college trustee's income is a bit closer to the working class community he represents--between $20,000 and $30,000 (Mills, 1971; Bernd, 1973; Goodson, 1973). In all cases, however, the typical trustee is from an infinitesimally small, economic elite. Eighty percent come from but nine occupational groups (Nearing, 1971). No single group involved

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6 The distortion within faculty is currently under strong attack. All indications are that the percentage of women academics will increase, if positions open. However, for many reasons the percentage of women professors is unlikely to exceed 30 percent in the remainder of this century.

in public trust could be more removed from the general public in terms of affluence and its accoutrements than are trustees.

Not surprising, then, the trustee's occupation reflects his education and relates to his wealth. Executives from business and industry, bankers, and lawyers predominate, and, as many say, dominate. In terms of constituencies, the only group to rival the power elite are the clergy. They comprise 11 percent of the trustees. Clergy, however, are found almost exclusively on the Boards of the private colleges and Catholic institutions, 15 and nine percent respectively. These percentages suggest multiple memberships, i.e., some persons serving on the Board of more than one college. With the exception of administrators in higher education (college presidents frequently sit on a colleague's Board), no other occupational group achieves five percent representation. Furthermore, many segments of society rarely or never appear. For example, accountants, writers, artists, musicians, journalists, scientists, architects, and labor compose either zero or less than one percent of Board membership.

One small group (under 4%) are of special interest to us--college and university faculty. In only one instance do academics exceed three percent, and that is in Catholic colleges. Historically, the Board of Catholic colleges and universities is composed of the leaders in their particular order, several of whom are also on the institution's staff -- nine percent, to be exact.[7]

Almost without a flaw, then, the image of age, sex, and education interlaces with the education, occupation, and economic status just displayed. The trustee picture is rounded out by presenting some attitudes and beliefs trustees hold about matters both within and without higher education.

Attitudes and Beliefs

While their political party preference is Republican nearly twice as frequently as it is Democrat, about three-fifths of trustees classify

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[7] The presence of clergy and academics also reflects on the wealth of trustees. Were these two groups removed, the trustee income data would shift upward and the extraordinary income of the typical trustee would even more greatly differentiate him from the population as a whole.

themselves as moderates. The remainder state they are either conservatives or else liberals, and in approximately equal numbers. Two-thirds express political and social views similar to Nixon and Rockefeller, only nine percent like George Wallace, 12 percent like Benjamin Spock, and 25 percent like William Buckley, Jr. In this area of political predilection, diversity overshadows unanimity.

As far as internal matters on colleges and universities go, difference of opinion rather than concensus exists, except for their high unanimity on the belief that the president is to be a leader (as contrasted to mediator) and on institutional goals (such as concern for student values, educational opportunity for all, and a few others). For example, on issues like loyalty oaths for faculty, student discipline off campus, and faculty representation on the Board, trustees are likely to divide about equally on both sides.

At the same time, on authority and decision-making matters, there is overwhelming agreement that students and faculty are not to have a controlling voice. Only three percent of trustees felt students should be able to decide matters pertaining to student cheating, the topic which received the highest percentage of support of any of 16 issues, including adding or removing fraternities and sororities, student housing rules, and priorities in the athletic program. Faculty fared little better. Fourteen percent of the trustees thought faculty alone could have major authority in making course changes. Only one percent thought faculty should have similar authority in the appointment of an academic dean, the faculty's "own" first among equals.[8]

In summary, then, trustees are much alike in the select rungs of society from which they come and in having highly similar characteristics of race, sex, religion, and age. They are more variable in social-political attitudes both on and off campus but as almost unanimous in not delegating authority on anything to either students or faculty.

Some Inferences From the Facts

Many important inferences follow from the examination of the evidence. Only a few, however, are selected for special attention here. They are inferences which bear most directly on the issues of conflict

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[8] Trustees believe students should have a strong voice on many of these matters, and even major authority in some instances. Similarly, they believe faculty should have extensive influence on curricular decisions, but delegated authority, no.

over governance, on who should decide and the processes by which decisions are reached. In the jargon of the day, two observations have to do with "gaps"--a generation gap and a representation gap.

Representation Gap

The representation gap relates to the historical evolution of Boards of control moving from the internal authority of faculty and administration to the external control of lay persons. Colleges are a public trust, and the members of Boards literally derive their name from this basic conception. The fundamental premise of lay control is that it is for the good of society that representatives of society monitor the management of colleges and universities. It is assumed that lay citizens will guarantee that the societal aims expressed in the college's charter are fulfilled for the public good.

The representation gap can be seen as either the non-representation or the underrepresentation of many segments of society on Boards.[9] Said another way, Board members overwhelmingly come from a small and exclusive segment of the general population. This does not mean that Boards are ipso facto unable to ensure the wishes of the 99.9 percent, that they are irresponsible to societal wishes, or that any of a number of charges leveled against them have any validity. At the same time, however, their nonrepresentative composition makes them vulnerable to such accusations. When a decision runs counter to a pressure group, whether right or wrong, trustees spend valuable time defending what they do rather than doing what they should do. Their exclusiveness stigma detracts from their mission.

By way of illustration, the civil rights movement not only released widespread concerns for all mistreated people; it also produced legislation guaranteeing equal treatment and access to those who supposedly had it but, in fact, did not. As was seen in the data presented above, trustees concur in this desire. At the same time, they do not believe the right of access extends to their college. Problems arise when policies are debated with respect to recruiting minorities and providing support.

At the same time, Boards have altered their own make-up hardly at

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[9] Beck (1947) drew attention to this problem 30 years ago in his study of a group of universities. His vigorous presentation had no apparent impact on changing board composition.

all. Boards might well examine their composition and see what would be lost if others than those now represented filled vacancies. There are other citizens whose interest in higher education is as intense and sincere as is the current trustee concern, a point also emphasized recently by Dominguez (1973). Quite possibly different decisions would be reached were membership different. As will be argued at greater length below, constituency representation is not a principle being argued for here. Generally an acceptable mix is not practically possible. But more important, the chief function of Boards is defeated when issues are seen from the viewpoints of factions and interest groups. (See Heilbron (1973) and Cosand (1975).) When the inclusion of an academic on the Board is argued for later on, it will not be on the grounds of representation. The capability to make better decisions and improved quality are the grounds on which a Board should be assembled.

Generation Gap

The second gap, the generation gap, has several dimensions and numerous consequences. For example, the typical one needs little elaboration, except, perhaps, to mitigate it. Even were a Board composed quite differently from that of today, most trustees still will be over 30. Besides, frequently trustees have children in college. They may have the same failures as parents do at home with youth as administrators on campus seem to have in this area, but trustees are not without some first-hand experience of today's college-aged population.

However, a reasonably serious generation gap creates difficulties when the ways in which colleges have changed since the typical trustee was a student are examined. For example, the trustee's fond memories of his college days were in part what drew him to accept the call to the Board. But when he went to college, only about five percent of his age cohort did, not the 50 percent of today. There were no blacks on campus then. There weren't poor whites--nor hardly any middle class whites either, for that matter. His peers were from his social class. Fraternities, sororities, the big game--the many trappings he links to loyalty and a true liberal education--simply are all but non-existent today. At most they touch five percent of the student population, not 95 percent.

The trustee's college no longer exists. Furthermore, it can't be regenerated. Nor should it be, although this is a (suppressed) strong trustee desire. As seen above, the trustee expresses his belief that all have the right for higher education, but attending my college is a privilege. Contradictions such as these derive from the generation gap. They can breed dangerous consequences and a potential failure to keep

a public trust.

Governance Gap

Another important inference from the data on trustees and boards can be seen in the differing values held by trustees and by the principal workers in the organization, the faculty. Since the turn of the century, the trend has been for a greater faculty voice in the running of colleges and universities. At the same time, trustees tend to see faculty requests for decision making as power moves. The typical Board has been opposed to this faculty desire, or, begrudgingly to have given ground, bit by bit, but not to endorse or encourage it. But faculty view their desires as essential for a better functioning of the college. Faculty governance is vital for effective education, say faculty. The value gap sits behind these disputes.

Having provided a backdrop of general knowledge and research findings, the monograph turns to some generalizations about sound Board structure and function. Case studies of four Boards provide the context for increased understanding. Each case is an instance of a real Board facing a real problem.

CHAPTER II

FOUR CASES

Introduction

Analyses of decision-making more often focus on "who" does and should decide and less frequently on "how" decisions are reached, i.e., on the locus of power, rather than on process. The reasons for the imbalance of attention are understandable. In the first place, when viewed from the power perspective, "who" is what really matters. Second, most organizations are bureaucratic and hierarchical in nature; decisions are passed down from above and hence who is at what level is what is crucial for the understanding of what takes place in the organization. Third, "who" decides is easier to analyze than "how" and hence is an understandable place to begin analysis.

But "how" decisions are reached, that is, the process of decision-making is receiving greater attention, especially when studies demonstrate that the key to understanding why a particular decision was reached is based more on the nature of the decision-making event than it is on the characteristics of the persons who decided a course of action. Also, other studies demonstrate that participatory management is often more effective in achieving organizational goals than is the straight "top-down" model.

In addition, colleges and universities pride themselves with respect to their collegial nature, on being a community of equals where administrators are really faculty temporarily displaced in other offices and roles. This concept of shared authority is not held by all on every occasion by any means. Students will say faculty have the power; faculty attribute power to department chairpersons, who, in turn, say the dean has the power; and, of course, the dean is convinced the vice-president has all of the guns, who naturally . . . right up to the trustee. In fact, what studies of who has power in colleges tend to reveal is that each group is sure that they don't have it; real power, each constituency, says, resides somewhere else.

At the same time, on a more intensive analysis, it is learned that constituency satisfaction depends more upon the degree to which the individuals and/or groups believe they <u>influence</u> a decision than it does on whether they actually vote or not on an issue. Said another way, when the notion of "influence" is separated from the concept of "power",

then participation is not simply a question of who has power but rather becomes a question on the process of reaching a decision, that is, on the how of decision-making.

Four cases illustrate the critical role process plays in leading to wise decision-making. Each is a greatly reduced version of an extended presentation of the contributors recognized in the Preface. All are examples from private liberal arts colleges. However, the nature of the issues is such in each instance that it could likely appear before the Board of any type of college or university.

Four Cases

I. Faculty Workload

As reported by Zwingle and Mayville (1974:46) in their national trustee survey, 82 percent agreed with the statement: "The matter of equitable determination of optimum 'faculty workload' must receive more attention by trustees and administrators than has been true in the past."

At "Hilltop" college, the Board chairman began his approach to this issue about five years ago.[10] He used the mails to distribute a series of memoranda to all trustees. He argued that from the standpoint of cost, faculty workload had to increase. He expressed his concern about rising student costs. He believed that student protests were an inevitable event if fees were raised. He argued that faculty productivity had not kept up with increasing costs of operation, particularly with the increase in faculty salaries.

The solution to the problem, he wrote in his first release, was clear: increase the student faculty ratio by decreasing the number of faculty and increasing the length of the faculty work-year (without additional pay). Teaching aids (machines, tapes, etc.) were to replace faculty. The college was not to grow in size, not because it could not attract more students (it could, comparatively easily, and of the same high ability because of its reputation; it turns down about five quali-

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[10] Hilltop is a liberal arts college with about 1500 students and 100 faculty. It literally sits on a hill in a medium-sized industrial community in the Midwest. Hilltop has earned a national reputation and attracts students from across the country. It is highly selective in its admission process, requiring very high scores on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) and a distinguished high school record.

fied students for each accepted), but rather because one of Hilltop's chief strengths, according to all constituencies, was its small size. Smallness was to be maintained (even though the same objective of a higher workload per professor could be achieved by increasing the number of students).

The chairman's white paper was a persuasive one. Facts and figures documented excellent rhetoric. The chairman had a long and distinguished history with the college and has been a generous donor. He has participated nationally in the Association of Governing Boards. He had earned his reputation as a highly knowledgeable person in higher education. That he deeply cared about Hilltop was unquestioned.

Moreover, it must be noted that the chairman not only posed the problem; he also offered the solution. His memorandum to all trustees closed with the statement that his proposal would come before the next Board meeting as a motion for action, i.e., for a favorable vote.

How Hilltop faculty would react to that decision seems not to have been taken into consideration by the chairman. Nor was there any indication of how the president of the college stood on the proposition of faculty cutback and an extended work-year. Hilltop has a well-pedigreed faculty, able and dedicated. They expect to be highly involved in any decision which affects their welfare and/or their work activities. In short, had they known about the proposal one would accurately predict stormy times.

As it turned out, Wilbert McKeachie, a leading academic expert on many dimensions of the issue on the table, was a member of this Board. He responded in writing to the Chairman, with copies to other Board members.

McKeachie's response was a sober one, an analysis which clearly displayed his concern for the future of the college and for the quality education it stood for. He recognized the threatening financial straits and agreed as to the seriousness of their consequences. At the same time, he corrected what were some misinterpretations about faculty and their work and also supplied some research findings on the effectiveness of teaching aids and on such matters as how class size affects student learning.

For example, there was an implication in the Chairman's memorandum that faculty worked only nine months of the year (but were paid for twelve), much less than any other professional group. Faculty did not need that long a vacation in order to be ready for a new academic year in September, according to the Board chairman. McKeachie pointed out that his faculty (he was then chairman of a very large psychology de-

partment, a number which exceeded the entire faculty of Hilltop) all worked the year around and that none ever took vacations exceeding three weeks. He stated that his faculty were compensated for their work beyond the academic year, mostly by research funds that they had acquired from external sources. Year around work, however, was the norm for faculty, not the exception. Bill suggested that Hilltop try arrangements which would offer extra pay to faculty during the summer, but perhaps at less than their regular rate.

On the matter of teaching aids, McKeachie cited the findings that the student learning outcomes differ little from what can be learned from books (a teaching aid, too). He also gave data on class size, suggesting that after a certain number of students in a course increasing the size matters very little and that Hilltop could save some money in this way with some courses.

What McKeachie's communication did was acknowledge the issue but also demonstrated that the problem was a more complex phenomenon than first met the eye and that a single solution was not necessarily the best one. McKeachie's tactic gave the president an opportunity to enter the debate, again through the mails. The president introduced more factors.

The Board chairman kept the issue alive with a second and carefully prepared document, one containing appreciable cost data. It demonstrated that instructional expenses were the highest fraction of Hilltop's expenses. He also included inflation data and called to everyone's attention that Hilltop was joining other liberal arts colleges this year with its first deficit budget. When the chairman considered alternative courses of action the Board might take, he rejected all except reducing the size of the faculty by 25 percent. His memorandum ended with a concern about how to give fair notice of termination and the suggestion that his analyses and reasons for the faculty cutback be made available to the faculty by having them placed in the reading room of the college library.

McKeachie's next response was buttressed by a supporting memorandum from another trustee, also a professor, but from a private university in another state. McKeachie cited the research findings on class size and the attainment of different educational objectives. For example, since Hilltop's aim is to produce better learners, not just absorbers of knowledge, small classes are essential and that saving money by using only large classes would in essence change the kind of graduates Hilltop prided itself in.

The two professorial memoranda also responded to the tactics that were being suggested to inform the faculty of such an action. That the

market for new faculty was in the institution's favor today should there be extensive resignations--a point the Board chairman made in anticipation of this faculty action--also needed extensive discussion. The academic members wrote that the suggested plan of informing faculty after the fact that a 25 percent reduction could have serious consequences for the institution. Not only would all of the faculty be shocked that such actions were taken without their involvement, but also word of this kind of management would rapidly spread across the country. It would be difficult for Hilltop to recruit the high caliber faculty Hilltop has and wants. They also pointed out that decisions made in this way are likely to anger the faculty to such a degree that other unanticipated and undesired consequences would occur. Furthermore, they argued that it would be the very strongest faculty who would be most likely to depart, for they are the ones who can get positions elsewhere. The net result for Hilltop would be a double diminution of faculty talent--because, first, the best professors would leave while those who were not strong enough to be sought by others would stay and second, replacements would be likely to come from weaker groups because the best faculty will not come to work in an environment in which decisions are made without their consultation. Better, McKeachie suggested, would be to invite the faculty in, pose the cost and productivity problem to them, and invite them to join the Board in finding a solution.

The net effect of the information exchange was an education of the Board, all done in the spirit of what was best for Hilltop. Understanding increased.

II. Financial Crisis and Planning

"Endicott" College, like Hilltop, is a selective, private liberal arts college with a large Board, most of whom are alumni. While located in the East and in the shadows of the Ivy League, it too is located in a middle size industrial city. Until the new president, who is the central character in this case, assumed office, the college had essentially no interaction with the affairs of other colleges and with its immediate urban environment. A self-confident, isolationist stance was the way it had been, a position alumni, faculty, and students not only took for granted but one which most preferred.

When the new and able president began his tenure, he assumed a quite free reign. He came with knowledge of new things in higher education and acted to institute them. In a college steeped in tradition and where change was slow and deliberate, Endicott underwent a revolution in a couple of year's time. The academic calendar was altered, the curriculum revised, requirements were dropped, and a host of related matters underwent revision to put Endicott in the foreground with those

colleges receiving national attention for their innovations. The change was fomented from the top, not from student or faculty activists.

At the same time, and because he is a good president, he was trying to educate his Board. Prior to the monthly full-Board meetings, he served dinner in his house the evening before formal sessions were scheduled. After dinner discussions were held and were devoted to philosophical discussions about the nature of a liberal education, the liberal arts college in the last quarter of the 20th century, the obligations of the college to the immediate and larger society, what student growth and development and student freedoms meant vis-a-vis traditional subjects, consortia, and the like. The topics were not just the fads of the moment for the president; rather, he had sound principles upon which he launched his reforms and he wanted his Board to understand them.

However, despite the president's efforts, a rift was widening between the Board and himself. Not only were the changes which he had introduced and initiated too many and too extreme but his philosophical seminars were too far afield from the interests of the trustees. It was not a question of Board members being intellectually removed or unable to follow arguments; the discussions simply did not engage the trustees either in their area of special interest for being on the Board nor did the sessions ever utilize the special and high expertise each brought to his position at the college.

A partial solution to the growing rift occurred for reasons not directly related to the issues of a changed educational emphasis. Like Hilltop and other well run colleges of its type, Endicott too was suddenly faced with a large deficit. Now there was a genuine and immediate problem calling for Board solution. Not surprisingly, such a group of experts quickly turned to the necessity of planning. Inflation and increased costs were not going to go away overnight. Sound fiscal management called for projections, a series of plans and alternatives, the consideration of consequences for different courses of action. New knowledge, or at least a different kind of information, was called for and had to be generated. The data ranged from internal studies of almost every kind relating to the production of revenue and the reduction of costs to providing each member of the Board a subscription to The Chronicle of Higher Education, a newspaper dealing with current issues in a quick and readable format. (Whitehead, Dewey, and Hutchins were temporarily put back on the shelf and no longer assigned reading for the next Board meeting. The presession evening meetings still continued but the discussions were on proposed solutions to problems.) Trustee expertise was utilized to solve a problem on which almost all had considerable experience. As they became engaged in a meangingful way with respect to the college's future, so too did

the president learn how to prepare financial charts and present them to the Board.

Marvin Peterson, the academic person on the Board, had special expertise in institutional research and long-range planning and hence had a double set of entry points for assisting the education of the Board. For example, two of the president's innovations that trustees had reservations about with respect to their appropriateness for a liberal education, especially at Endicott--interinstitutional alliances (consortia) and off-campus work and internship experiences for students--now had a new relevance. Belonging to a consortium can reduce insurance rates and traveling lecturers and musical ensembles can be booked more efficiently and for less cost when done on a group basis. And, in the case of students leaving campus for an academic term for experiences not available on the Endicott campus, the possibility of increasing the size of the student body without the need for additional space and staff was easily seen as a financial asset if good planning and management were conducted.

This is not to say that trustees all of a sudden approved programs and arrangements because of favorable fiscal outcomes. Rather what began to happen at Endicott was that trustees began to use their talents as problem solvers to better link educational experiences with costs and began to create plans beyond those which the president had initially introduced (without real Board involvement) on educational grounds alone. A board became educated into the workings of its college and the larger world of higher education at the same time that a president learned a process for utilizing talent he had essentially engaged only as passive students in his class on higher education. A schism between the president and the Board was quickly closed and the weld gave a temper to the structure that exceeded by far its initial high tensile strength.

III. Segregation and HEW Regulations

Antioch has seldom experienced extended periods of tranquility. In fact, a basic educational and philosophical principle Antioch endorses is that conflict is a prerequisite for learning. Since learning is an institutional goal, controversy is to be generated if it does not occur in the normal course of events. Hence Antioch seldom lacks for issues. Rather, the only question here is which to choose from a wide assortment so as to both be representative and illustrative. The following case deals with an external threat to the college.

Shortly after student sit-ins (principally by blacks protesting that promises made to them had not been kept) at Board meetings changed those closed sessions (typical at private liberal arts colleges) to public

meetings, another response to student demands created a totally unexpected problem. Black students wanted a residence hall of their own. To develop personal and black identity was one of many compelling reasons the Antioch community supported the request, for the goal was in accord with their social philosophy.

However, and now in Theodore Newcomb's (then the Chairman of the Board) words: "These events raised strenuous criticism from a few Board members, because the College was lending its approval to segregation. These critics included two nationally known figures--one a prominent black who resigned forthwith from the Board; the other a well known attorney, long active in civil rights, whom I helped to persuade to 'fight from within' rather than resigning. The stance of a large majority of the Board, and also of the administration, was that the issue should be decided on educational grounds. That is, the Board would not, on the one hand, forbid the continuation of those arrangements which we had been persuaded were felt to be necessary at that moment. (Perhaps we had some sense of guilt over our earlier delinquencies?) On the other hand, the Board would place its faith in the ability of the community, including the blacks themselves, to recognize and deal with whatever unfortunate aspects of the de facto segregation were becoming apparent.

"However, our problem was considerably exacerbated by the entry into the scene of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. They informed President Dixon that we were perhaps violating certain provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and that he must submit quarterly reports concerning proportions of blacks and of other students living in the black section of the dormitory. An unfavorable ruling from HEW would have ended the very considerable amount of financial support of various kinds that the College was then receiving from federal sources.

"Naturally, Board members were concerned at this turn of events. Not a few of them felt that now the time had come to end the de facto segregation, by presidential edict. One trustee, with support from a few others, informed me that in the absence of such presidential action he would move to demand the resignation of the President. My response was that I did not believe such a proposal would receive general Board support, and that in any case I thought we had better means at hand to deal with the segregation issue.

"What I did not tell him, at that time, was that President Dixon and I were both in touch with black leaders on the campus. Our strategy was a simple one: the loss of federal funds would injure the 'black cause' more directly, and more immediately, than it would hurt other segments of the College. We managed to persuade the blacks that, just

as the present arrangements were made at their instigation, so also would they have to devise a solution to the problem that followed. They listened, but did not respond. They faced some 'educational' (political) problems within their own group. I agreed with the President that, for the time being at least, we had to place our faith in these processes, within the black group. For at least a fortnight we (or I, at least) lived only with that faith; I was assured that something, I knew not what, was going on.

"The answer came at the next Board meeting. Our mistake--the blacks', the administration's, and the Board's--had not been that the decision had been too 'radical'; rather, it had not been radical enough. We had all assumed that the problem had been a racial one. We should have realized that, more fundamentally, it was a matter of social class--not blackness, but poverty. If the Board had been really serious about its earlier commitment to 'an even break for blacks,' it would now look deeper. It would authorize a more inclusive program at Antioch for the poverty-stricken of all races and colors." (The residence hall was now open to anyone from a poverty background. Race, religion, et al. were not the determiners.)

Here again, an order for a particular course of action was not issued, even though it would have been legally justified and supported. Instead, those who were affected were invited to join in the finding of a solution to a problem. In this case, the principal problem solvers were black students, but they were aided by trustees and the administration. The solution they found not only met the letter and spirit of the law; it also deepened everyone's understanding. The root of a deep social and human issue was exposed, understood, and acted upon.

IV. A Presidential Search

Wade Ellis and Howard McClusky were each involved at their respective colleges in the search for a new president, an activity Boards face, on the average, once every decade. While the two settings were distinct and different along several important dimensions--McClusky's was a college of an atypical, but very clear, ideological stance located in a rural environment and Ellis' a women's Catholic college in a large, urban setting--it is possible to extract a number of common elements that can illustrate a Board dealing with hiring its chief institutional representative.

For example, both colleges were suffering from declining enrollments and financial uncertainties. McClusky's college, however, was not about to change its basic religious stance. Primarily, it needed a president to fit its ideology. On the other hand, Ellis' college was

much less certain of its future and very much wanted an individual who would reverse the college's downward trend, almost irrespective of the direction a new president might take it.

The first surprise both Boards encountered was that the reputation of the presidency being a high pressure job, one so severe that no genuinely sane person would want it, either is not true or that there is a very large number of people who border on the edge of good mental health. Once a vacancy becomes known, the institution suffered not at all from an inadequate pool of applicants. Just the opposite, in fact. Their problem quickly becomes one of dealing with large numbers of persons, only a few of whom may have been sought to become candidates.

The second surprise for the trustee who has not been involved in the search process before is the very large number of people who just happen to know precisely who the next president should be. These "friends of the college" know why their nominee would be the greatest president the college has ever had. They know the criteria for the office better than the Board does. (Most often the Board has not yet established a set of specifications.) What may also catch the novitiate trustee off guard at this early stage in the process is that such insistent advancement of a single individual--the right person--will come from Board members themselves. Furthermore, a message can be transmitted that the ideal candidate may even be a Board member.

At this juncture, when the first flood crest of nominees passes, the Board can settle into the problem of finding the next leader of the institution. They can start to raise the more appropriate questions--the task of separating the notion of the right person from the best person, for example. What the trustees need at this point in time is a short course in the process of selecting a president.

An experienced trustee is invaluable here, and an academic trustee who has been through the process before can be of enormous help to the rest of the Board. The Board has no doubts that selecting the president is their most important function, but they can be at a loss as to how to proceed. As Ellis' guidelines suggest (see Appendix A), bringing in an expert has many advantages. This neutral person can mitigate Board splits that frequently occur and help in the education of the Board. For example, in the case of Ellis' institution, since it is a Roman Catholic college, the criterion that the president be Catholic was advanced by some members. The question then had to be raised as to whether the college wanted the best Catholic it could find to take the presidency or whether the college wanted the person who could best lead the college to take the presidency.

In both McClusky's and Ellis' colleges, an issue became a problem

to be solved. Trustees had to learn about their college so that they were certain what it really stood for, why it existed, and why they thought it should continue to do so. Where was higher education heading in the next five years, and over a longer span? What are the institution's strengths and weaknesses? What kind of an individual will it take to preserve what we value most and what kind of a person can best take us in the directions we wish to go? Who can solve the problems we have and will inevitably face? Such an analysis cannot be done in one sitting, but it must occur before any sensible screening of candidates can take place. Only after such an institutional assay has been completed can real persons be put up against an ideal.

Much more is involved, of course. Involving relevant constituencies--alumni, students, and faculty. Soliciting nominations from all interested parties, individuals as well as groups. Screening is a most difficult task, as is courting an individual to become a candidate. More often than not the person identified as the best possible in the world may have no interest at all in the position and high level salesmanship is called for. McClusky's search committee used videotaping of interviews with prospective candidates as a way all could "see and hear" a candidate. This was a most effective technique for it was not possible for all on the committee to go to another location for an interview or to be present when the prospect was available. Everyone wanted to be fully involved, and videotaping made it possible.

This is not the place to spell out all of the tactics and strategies of a presidential search. We simply repeat that this phenomenon which is common for all Boards at some time in their history also is in essence an educational process and calls for the participation of members and the use of their expertise. The temptations to submit to displays of legitimate power are great and need to be avoided. Utilizing Board member talents to solve a problem is a far superior tactic than is allowing the Board executive committee to act without adequately incorporating the contributions others can make.

Conclusions

The four cases have dealt with real issues, some very typical (the search and selection of a president) and others less universal (integrating a black residence hall). What the four cases have in common, though, is the resolution of issues by a process other than mandates from above. In each instance, an institutional issue was recast from a direct compliance or one individual's (the president or the board chairman's) solution into a problem to be solved.

In addition, once an issue was seen as a problem, then its status changed as well. No longer was the issue an ominous threat to the

future of the college, and perhaps to the future of some individuals. Now the issue was a challenge. And, as a challenge, the number of people involved in finding solutions increased. The expertise of board members was utilized. Instead of the traditional, passive, noninterfering Board who relied exclusively on the president for the answer to an issue, these cases tapped the talents of those who had volunteered to serve. A highly under-utilized pool of knowledge and skill was brought into action. Distinguished persons who had come from successful problem solving roles in the conduct of their daily work were now able to test their abilities in a new setting. They liked the challenge and, not unexpectedly, they rose to the occasion.

Furthermore, other worthy ends were accomplished with this change of process. Board members--and college presidents--were educated, especially about the workings of colleges and their students and faculty. They learned about trends in student enrollments, the state of faculty supply and demand, how foundation support is changing, for example. And, of course, they learned much more about their own college--how degree requirements and expenses are altered by off-campus programs, for example. Trustees began to think more about alternatives that are open for colleges across the country, including their own. They could ask questions about how consistent an innovation would be with the central aims and mission of the college and reason out answers. They could begin to extrapolate consequences of different decisions. In short, they began to function the way they expect Board members of their corporations to perform, as expert problem solvers in the area of policy analysis and policy setting.

Another consequence of this Board change in process can be expected, even though empirical evidence is not in hand to document it. Board involvement of this kind must increase commitment to the college and an increase in all of the positive concomitants which accompany dedication. The noninvolvement stance of the past was never good stewardship in the first place. More often than not, the trustee was courted to join a Board because he or she possessed talents the college needed. The expectation was that if the person accepted the call, he or she would be an active member.[11]

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[11] This, of course, is the ideal, and not always the real situation. Some Boards and college presidents fill chairs only with persons who have prestige or dollars, and that is understood by all at the outset. In the past, such "absentee" board members could be tolerated. Today, however, few colleges can afford the luxury of nonworking trustees, irrespective of their financial assets.

Thus, Board education, trustee involvement, and Board process and structure are three major principles emerging from the analyses. In addition to these general principles, the cases also suggest some specific tactics and strategies for good practice and effective action. We turn to these next.

First, we saw trustees did not read extensively enough in order to acquire the education in the world of colleges and universities they want and need. But a newspaper (The Chronicle of Higher Education) which biweekly highlighted events and issues was read and had impact. The shorter "how-to-do-it" and actual experiences were heeded when the longer works and less concrete discussions were not.

A second instructional device from the Endicott case was engaging trustees with real problems affecting the college. Furthermore, securing trustee involvement satisfied a basic desire of theirs to test their adequacy for the role they had assumed. The combination of education and action is especially important for the new trustee. Yet this obvious tactic is more often precisely the opposite from common practice. Usually the new member is given a "grace" period of no assignment of any consequence. He is excused from participation until he "knows enough", which, of course, is never. And the longer his real engagement is postponed, the more uncertain he is as to whether he belongs and the more reluctant will he become to ever engage in ways that genuinely matter. The wiser tactic is immediately to throw the new trustee into the fray.

The happy solution is the merger of involvement and education. Involve the trustee in an institutional problem, right away. Place her or him on the joint faculty-trustee committee studying the consequences of an early retirement policy (or whatever best utilizes the trustee's talents and is specific enough that a proposal will be forthcoming in a reasonably short period of time). The trustee will learn on the job, about local conditions as well as about higher education in general. Such trustee education is not in an orderly, systematic way, but it is a very realistic way. Trustees will learn they have to learn and that they can learn. A new trustee's desire to be involved and a natural feeling of inadequacy can both be attended to in that way. Learning on the job, education by doing, or whatever old saw is preferred, is what is being advanced. Nothing very new, nothing very sophisticated, yet too infrequently practiced.

The formation of trustee-administrator-faculty-student task forces is a third tactic, almost a corollary to the second. The education of the members of each constituency is enriched by work on a specific college problem. At the same time, basic ground work needed by the Board is accomplished. Full Board meetings must efficiently use trustee time. An unresearched problem should not be launched in the few hours full

Boards have together. Additionally, the constituency task force approach provides a body upon which ideas can receive a preliminary testing. A proposed solution to an institutional problem needs a sounding board in advance of a public hearing and/or a full Board meeting. If a proposal runs strongly counter to a group, it will be revealed. Then alternatives, persuasion, or whatever is required can be undertaken before opposition creates hostile camps and derails efforts to solve the original problem.

Fourth, Endicott's pre-session discussions are another strategy for Boards to note. Informal talk in a relaxed setting the evening before a scheduled meeting permits clarification of positions and removal of unwarranted concerns that may have been fallaciously inferred from written documents read on the way to the college. And the authors of a proposal can discover errors and/or oversights that can be corrected before the formal sessions. Both parliamentary procedures and personal egos are much less strained if agreements are reached before rather than during meetings.

A fifth tactic comes from the Hilltop and Endicott cases (and no doubt was utilized by the others, but just was not mentioned). This is the communication concern--the circulation of position papers and the sharing of letters of rebuttal and debate, for example. Endicott's president adopted the business practice of providing charts and hard data as ways of displaying trends and consequences, devices many trustees are accustomed to and find more helpful. Other techniques of informing constituencies of what is being deliberated need to be fully utilized so that announced new policies do not catch affected groups by surprise. The Board may believe what they decide is best (and/or necessary) for all, but an action which has negative consequences for any constituency is more easily digested when some warnings of its inevitability are signalled in advance.

Finally, trustees differ not from others when it comes to success and failure. Solutions which work are more pleasurable than problems that escape a fully happy resolution. To only throw problems at trustees and never let them participate in the positive outcomes of their efforts violates this human trait. When plaudits came to Endicott for its participation in the affairs of its city (at first a matter of no trustee concern, even one with negative overtones, but later a decision as a solution to a problem), the simply tactic of trustee sharing is obvious, but too often overlooked.

These, then, are some straightforward tactics and strategies the cases revealed. None is really surprising, especially in retrospect. Furthermore, they are all in accord with what is known about the essential ingredients of problem solving, the necessity of a creative ten-

sion, the maintenance of a delicate balance between security and challenge. Trustees bring with them the security of success in their chosen vocations. The challenge is there. Issues abound. Trustees have the competence of dealing with real problems of organizations. Self-confidence builds with success. Involvement heightens curiosity. Loyalty assures enthusiasm, as does leadership from Board Chairman and President. The tactics and strategy just extracted contribute to competence, self-confidence, curiosity, and enthusiasm. They follow from the general principles as well as the record of the cases. But too often the Board member's talents were never tapped. When they are, then commitment will follow from participation.

Last, what was common in the resolution of these four issues was the central role played by the trustee who was an academic person by profession. It is not that this trustee was any more or less supportive of the college, that he cared any more or less about the outcomes, that he was any more or less bright or good at problem solving, but he did bring in firsthand experience and knowledge about the issue. He was able to relate what was happening at other colleges and thereby not only increase understanding but also reduce tension. When trustees learned that they were not the only group in the country in the same straits, some comfort obtained and cooler heads prevailed. Also, this academic Board member was educating his colleagues in general ways about higher education. He could explain, probably more effectively than the president could in some instances, why faculty value some of the things they do, matters that at first glance do not make full sense to those in other occupations--academic freedom and tenure, and their relation, for example.

In fact, the special contribution that a professor can make as a Board member is a topic of sufficient concern that a more complete analysis is called for. The next and final chapter of this monograph examines this rare practice. It weighs the strengths and limitations of professors serving on Boards.

CHAPTER III

ACADEMICS ON BOARDS

There are no general comparative studies that assess the effectiveness of differently-constituted Boards, nor could such research be easily conducted. Furthermore, we cannot tell in our particular cases if the colleges would have performed better or worse without an academic on the Board. We do not know if the solutions to their problems would have been the same or different, arrived at in more or less time, and carried out with greater or less expenditure of energy and money. Hence, an argument adduced that every Board should have a professor on it rests on other than empirical evidence. That position, however, is precisely the one we advance.

To begin, the idea of academics as trustees is not novel. Harvard University and the College of William and Mary began that way, even if the idea did not spread. So did Cornell have its own professors, even in 1916 (Perlman, editor, 1973). Roman Catholic colleges nearly always had their own staff in dual roles of board and faculty member. The American Association of University Professors discussed the topic not so many years ago (Thompson, 1949). Nasson (1974: pp. 27-38) has reminded the reader of the potential hazards of a local faculty member on the Board (conflict of interest; confusion of roles; and unrepresentativeness of the public welfare). In short, the idea is not new.

However, the data which do exist on the topic invite diverse interpretations. The Rauh (1969) and Hartnett (1969) survey uncovered that just over three percent of trustees are professors. Since the average Board has around twenty members, arithmetically, then, about half the Boards would have an academic, half would not. But if our cases are indicative of the actual distribution, far less than half the Boards have a professor as a trustee. In half of our cases--all of which had a faculty members as a Board member--there were two professors on the Board, and, in one instance, three trustees were professors. (Note that in each case the academic was a professor at a college at other than the one under discussion, a point to which we will return.) Such numerical calculations lead to the inference that a more accurate estimate of the number of Boards with faculty on them would be one in five, a not very high percentage.

Two inferences seem reasonable: (1) most Boards have not thought a professor an important enough contributor to be certain that one serves

on their Board;[12] and (2) those Boards that have taken on a professor apparently have found his contribution valuable enough to merit taking a second. In addition, since the professor's principal contribution is knowledge and effort and not his money, and since a professor displaces a chair of a potential major dollar contributor, Boards with professors have decided that faculty expertise is paying its way.

Not only is it highly likely that the professor's financial support is the least of any trustee (excepting, perhaps, that of a minister who might also serve), he is unlikely to have friends who have money. Professors' closest friends are other professors. (Here a minister frequently has entree to those who have and could give money and hence indirectly can serve in a fund-raising role.) Furthermore, professors are not even potential callers for money. They do not belong to country clubs or service organizations.

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12 This statement perhaps should be put even more strongly: Most trustees do not want academics on their Boards. In the Zwingle and Mayville survey (1974: 44), only 26 percent thought faculty should be on boards--whether the professor was from their own or another institution and even in a nonvoting status. Furthermore, on a nearly two to one basis, current trustees believe they can represent all groups within a college, including faculty (p. 42). In addition, faculty as trustees are not wanted as an alternative to collective bargaining, even though unionization is a board anathema (Hermann, 1974). Also, Academe (1976: 6) reports "strong opposition from the Board of Trustees" when Delaware's governor appointed a professor at the University of Delaware to its Board.

The reasons for the widespread feelings against faculty membership have not been studied, but they are not new. (Fisher (1968) found them in his study in the sixties and other signs point to this same stance long before then.) Commentators (e.g., Pfnister (1970)) gave the conflict of interest and similar arguments. However, trustee expressions against faculty seem to go beyond principles of sound organizational practice and to include personal resentments. We need to learn more here.

In short, the academic contribution is an educational one and yet some Boards still have found their contribution to process highly valuable.[13]

Thus far our case for an academic on the Board has implicitly talked about him as though he were from the faculty of a different institution, not his own. But before further developing the unique and distinctive contribution the outside professor can make, we examine the pros and cons of having a local staff member also serve as a trustee. Recently there has been increased pressure for both students and faculty of a college to have a seat on their own college's Board. So far the merits and limitations of such an arrangement have not had a public hearing.

In the first place, it is not illegal for a salaried professor, and hence employee, to be a Board member, contrary to an often stated assertion usually introduced to dismiss the notion outright. Some particular charters and/or constitutions might have to be changed in order for legal barriers to be removed. However, legally such changes are always possible. Roosevelt University, a case to be discussed below, has in its constitution that a certain percentage of the Board must be filled by current staff of Roosevelt University. So, legally, the institution's own faculty can also be on their own college's Board.[14] We return, then,

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13 Occasionally Boards will have a distinguished academic on their roster, primarily for display purposes. He gives a kind of legitimacy some feel important. He is not really expected to attend meetings, and rarely does. Nor does he serve the role described in our cases and advocated here. His showcase membership exists to prove to the outside world that this really is a distinctive college, one that holds education at its pinnacle. Maybe his chair is expected to mollify the local faculty. (Why high reputation faculty accept such calls is not known.) It is not known how widespread the pseudo trustee is. Even if not extensive, it nonetheless reduces the participating number of professors on Boards and the number of Boards with a professor effectively contributing.

14 Unionized faculty can become an exception. Collective bargaining separates employers from employees into legally distinct camps. While the case has not yet risen, the prediction is that trustees will be able to reject a local unionized employee--namely, a faculty member--from a seat on their Board. The unionized college still can have an academic from another college as a trustee, however, for this arrangement would not violate the typical labor-management relationship.

to the advantages and disadvantages of having an individual simultaneously in the role of faculty member and trustee at the same college.

The positive side of the ledger contains obvious and persuasive points. For example, faculty are the principal employees of the organization, both in terms of the size of their group as well as the percentage of the budget they receive. Board decisions greatly affect their lives. Therefore, they, particularly as professionals in a collegial setting, deserve a voice in decisions of highest import.[15]

Before we go on, however, let us make clear our stand on this point. Following Cosand (1975), we believe a Board must first of all consist of a group of able and dedicated persons. There is no room for politically motivated or self-serving individuals on a Board. Disaster will result for a Board unable to work as a group for the larger aims. A Board which splits into factions for any cause portends dire outcomes and will have to be reconstituted if the institution is to survive. Certainly a broad-based membership can make concerns of all parties more likely to be heard and understood. Yet, it is every Board member's obligation to come to understand and fairly act for all individuals and groups who have a legitimate stake in the college. In short, a professor has no right on a Board by virtue of the fact that he or she is a professor (within or without the institution). In fact, was there any possibility that an academic person served as a partisan, then that individual--as well as a partisan for any other constituency--is unqualified for Board membership.

At the same time, just because an individual is a professor is no basis for automatic disqualification for Board membership. No one better knows the faculty concerns than a chosen representative of that very group. Faculty are not without ideas for improving the organization. Faculty care about their institutions, as much or even more than anyone else, including the Board members. In matters like elections to the head of the college's academic senate, studies show that faculty select their most revered and distinguished colleagues, not incompetents, not revolutionaries. The professor who regularly has demonstrated his concern for what is best for his college, not for himself

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[15] This argument releases foul odors for some. It calls forth memories of student demonstrators throwing bricks through windows when their similar claims for deciding institutional policies affecting their lives were not granted. The argument, however, should not be rejected on these grounds. It needs to be examined on its internal merits.

or any interest group, is the individual who rises to the position of faculty leader.

Also, the trustee professor can help to relieve those colleagues who tend to mistrust Boards. In the same way that a department chairperson acts to take the interests and concerns of the faculty up the administrative echelons, he or she also can be the best explainer of why a particular administrative negative answer was made to a faculty request. The middleman role also would apply at the trustee-board level.

Some have expressed concern as to whether or not the faculty board member can be trusted, say, to maintain silence in the case of confidential matters of property negotiation or on personnel decisions. Faculty who press to have a seat on the Board find the frequent inference that they cannot be trusted doubly disdainful and distasteful. The Board says, "Trust me. I'm doing everything I can for you". When there is no professor on the Board, the academic has no alternative but to trust. However, the faculty member keeps asking himself, why can't the Board trust me by letting me see and hear how and what they decide? Trust is a two-way affair if it is to have genuine meaning. Boards must ensure the faculty they do trust them. If they decide not to have a local professor as a member, they should do so for a completely different set of reasons. Even if trustees are unable to persuade faculty that it is not in their or the college's best interest to have a seat on the Board, they will be much farther ahead by avoiding saying "trust us".

Furthermore, the local faculty member can be expected to be an active board member, a higher attender, and one who will give many hours to the task. He will be a good spokesperson for student concerns, even if not always a full advocate. He can quickly and accurately transmit the mores on campus. No doubt his presence will mitigate some natural tendencies a president might have to exaggerate about how well the college is doing. Even in this minor "conscience" role he makes a contribution.

An expanded description of Roosevelt University substantiates the case made thus far for having a local professor on the Board. From its inception at the close of World War II, the University was to incorporate all of the democratic principles associated with its chosen name. From the outset it served the urban environment and minority groups, a full twenty years before higher education in general declared such activities as a "new" mission. Not surprisingly, then, the original charter called for faculty of the institution to be five of the twenty-one trustees (Perlman, 1971).

The Board has since expanded in numbers, and the faculty percentage from the institution fell. It has stabilized at about one-sixth. How-

ever, while the remainder of the Board has sometimes failed to elect its full share of members and frequently has been slow in filling vacancies, the faculty have not. Resignations are quickly replaced and every allocated seat is filled. Furthermore, faculty attend meetings with high regularity. Their 17 percent constituency is likely to be 25 to 50 percent of those present for voting at any given Board session. Hence, a faculty person is always heard.

Perlman's (1971) study of Roosevelt University found no instance of faculty acting as a power block. Nor did he uncover clean divisions into faculty and lay camps on issues. Two crisis situations twice divided the Board, but not along "inside-outside" lines. Perlman does note that "pure" faculty are giving way to faculty who are principally administrators at the University, i.e., individuals who maintain an academic appointment and occasionally teach but who have administrative tasks as their principal assignments. Perlman judges the administrator-faculty to be more influential and effective with lay trustees than is the strictly academic member of the Board.

One cannot generalize from a single case, especially when the institution is as atypical as is Roosevelt. At the same time, the viability of the institution through anything but the most favorable of environmental circumstances, at least establishes the fact that having staff participate in the innermost levels of confidence and decision-making is not lethal. Indeed, it may even be vital for survival.

As was witnessed in the cases, a professor on the Board will be listened to. He can be a significant asset to a Board. These and other positive attributes and contributions marshall a strong case for having a resident staff member on the Board.

We now turn to the disadvantages.[16] The negative side of the ledger also needs to be recorded before our recommendation is advanced.

As was seen in Chapter I, the historical lay control by Boards was introduced for sound reasons. Even the president, as powerful as he is on the Board, is ex-officio, and for the same good reasons. To seat an employee, and that is what a faculty member is, violates the rationale.

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16 We remind the reader we are always talking about a "good" professor just like we are always assuming the trustee lawyer, business executive, whoever, is "good", i.e., able and talented and above partisan politics.

This is a good reason not to have the institution's own staff on the Board.

Other difficulties can arise. Inevitably a conflict of interest case will come up. For example, funds are voted for a public relations firm to recruit students and solicit alumni giving when faculty salary raises do not match the increased cost of living; or the decision not to award Professor Smith tenure despite the affirmative recommendations of his highly respected peers because a policy has been set to limit the percentage of tenured faculty; or . . . If there is a local professor on the Board, other members--executive committee or not--are bound to talk behind his back. But there never should be private caucuses which exclude an individual because of current status. If there needs to be a discussion on whether or not to continue with the current president--an occasion more than one Board has faced in its history--no one can be excluded because of her or his role. Yet the temptation to so circumvent the local professor would be great.

The alternatives open for the local professor trustee in such conflicts of interest are not really very satisfactory. Resignation is a legitimate form of protest, but solves nothing. The successor inherits the same situation. A second possibility--open, public confrontation--transgresses an ethic to which the professor subscribes. Moreover, compromising her or his character is indecent. On down the list, each alternative, and particularly the damage done to her or him as an individual (to say nothing of the emotional strain) is really unfair to the professor. He should not be so tortured, and he need not be. An academic from another college can speak nearly as effectively for the local professorial concern, if that position is not being given a fair hearing. In addition, because the professor from another college is not on the staff, he cannot be placed on the rack. All in all, there is much to commend a professor on a Board, but not a local academic.

The outside professor will be more effective if from the same type of an institution, or if he or she has had extended experiences with the type of college. An experimental physicist at a highly research orientated multiversity may have nearly as much difficulty in comprehending life on a liberal arts college campus as does the corporation lawyer. Newton's laws of motion may be the only point of contact with the local professor of physics.

Ideally, the academic on the Board would not only enjoy national respect within his discipline but he also would be active in regional and national affairs in higher education, possibly through work with accrediting agencies, consulting, writing on general problems facing students, faculty and colleges. He will know what ideas are based on sound principles and which are simply gimmicks. He will know what has

been instituted at similar colleges. His very willingness to serve on a Board is a strong indication of his dedication to higher education in general. Volunteering precious hours and inviting inevitable headaches demonstrate a concern that extends beyond his own campus.

As a professional, the outside professor will protect himself from being an emissary for a special interest group. At the same time, his singular presence at the Board table guarantees that how any and every Board decision will affect faculty will be asked. As those of us who sit on institutional committees with students have learned the past few years, the student's very presence--even when the student is thought to be deficient in knowledge or in experience--has improved decision-making immensely. Not only are grevious errors not made, but more imaginative and better solutions to problems are found.

As has been seen and discussed above, the academic is a valuable and valued interpreter of presidential ideas. He can aid in the education of a Board, the very education they know they need and desire. He can assure members that proposed new ideas have been tried elsewhere (most have) and are not pure risk. He can translate educational ideas into their business world parallels. He can be a safety valve for those emergencies that sometimes erupt in president and faculty wars.

In addition--and not inconsequentially--this external professor will learn. As an astute and concerned individual he will become sensitized to the strong pressures and conflicting demands a college president faces, strains and conflicts he had not fully recognized before assuming board membership. When he is back on his own campus, he can become--because he cares--a more effective mitigator of typical and traditional administrator-faculty disputes. And, of course, were this practice of academics serving other colleges and universities generalized, nearly every campus would have one of its most distinguished professors on some college's Board. Thus nearly every college would have on its own campus an academic who could interpret to its faculty what its administration and Board are about. All of higher education benefits.

The case, then, is strong for every Board to seat at least one academic. Additionally, weighing the pros and cons of whether the professor should be on the college's own faculty or from another institution leads to our belief that the better policy and practice is to go outside the college for academic wisdom. If all colleges and universities followed the practice, then the person who gives this volunteer service knows that a professional colleague from another college will be on his Board. Unresolvable situations are avoided. The unfounded myths about what is good for higher education are dissipated while the health and well-being of our colleges and universities are improved.

APPENDIX A

A Presidential Search

A Board and its institution should of necessity make a careful, wise, and complete preparation before initiating (though perhaps not before announcing) a search for presidential candidates. As it approaches such a preparation, the Board should determine the depth and extent of resources available in the academic and administrative offices of the institution to facilitate the preparation. Often such resources are concentrated in a few offices and are thus easily accessible. Other resources will reside in the offices of any consortia to which the institution belongs, and in the reports or files of the various specialized accrediting organizations, especially in those of the five regional general voluntary accrediting associations. While the collection and assay of such resources are important, there is no need to delay developments in the actual search itself pending completion of this necessarily preliminary step. Information, attitudes, and opinions thus developed can be communicated to the search on campuses. The periodic self-studies made in connection with the establishment or maintenance of accreditation, the various committee reports to the faculty, the dean's, vice-presidents', and provosts' reports to the President, the President's Annual Report, the periodic financial statements and reports, statements of directors of development, of admissions, and of placement, as well as the variety of other documents (some of which will have lost some kinds of pertinent and perhaps important or even crucial information while being overedited) all are worth careful perusal. Reports and recommendations generated by teams of recent visitors representing regional accrediting agencies or special interest academic or professional groups should be studied. The report of the most recent fund-raising campaign will yield information about the extent, nature, and sources of recent and prospective financial support.

Such a review of the present and recent status of an institution requires a rather large investment of time and effort on the part of Board members, both privately and in meeting assembled. Also, if Board members do represent a wide spectrum of interests, the tentative conclusions they reach about the nature, conditions, prospects, and needs of the institution may be quite varied, so much so, perhaps, as to generate extensive, time-consuming, and even counterproductive discussions. In almost all cases, therefore, it will be desirable, time-

saving, and productive to employ a consultant or consultants to assist and advise the Board in this effort. A properly chosen consultant, with adequate instructions, can provide for the Board the professional (as opposed to clerical) support it will almost certainly need as it culls, digests, and evaluates information about the institution. He can also assist with the interpretation of the findings as they bear upon the future of the institution. His contribution will be enhanced if he appears before the Board (or the appropriate committee of the Board) to explain and defend his formal report. The choice of such consultants should be made only after both general and specific references from sources (including similar institutions having used such consultants in the recent past) have been reviewed. Sometimes the regional voluntary general accrediting agencies, not necessarily the one serving the area in which the institution is located, can provide assistance, as can university units studying higher education.

Without fail, all the constituencies of the institution--faculty, students and their families, alumni, loyal moral and material supporters, as well as administration--should be solicited for whatever communications they might wish to make to the Board and its consultants. A public announcement, properly timed, may be appropriate. The assay should be as nearly completely open as may be possible. Any decisions to withhold hard information (as opposed to hearsay and opinion) should be examined not only for purpose and potential for achieving that purpose, but also for possible counterproductive side-effects and damage to whatever credibility the Board and administration may enjoy.

When the evaluation is well along in its development, the Board may approach the problem of attempting to sketch out some broad tentative outlines as to what directions of development the institution should take during the next several years, what services to higher education and to its constituencies it should render during that period, and what its situation will be at the end of that period. The word "several" as used here should be specifically defined as, say, five or six or seven or so on. The longer the period, the less precise the outlines will be, so that a period of more than one decade might be virtually useless for purposes of suggesting the attributes of the next President. Furthermore, in the present ambience it is difficult enough to foretell what kinds of happenings there may be in the next five years; even then, the half-life of forecasts on many occurrences in higher education seems to be about 2 years. While those responsible for the future of an institution must try to forecast needs for at least the early part of that future, they do not have an obligation to become enamored of (and therefore probably deluded by) such a forecast. Moreover, the lure of the seer being what it is these days, the temptation to believe totally in forecasts after their validity has been partly destroyed remains strong. Boards need to keep this fact in mind.

The final results of the assay may cause the Board to alter its first tentative sketches of the institution's near future and its longer term potential and responsibilities. With these modifications, the new tentative sketch becomes a very important and valuable if not altogether indispensable basis for describing, in prospect, the new President.

After about this time the Board should set up annotated lists of optimal characteristics and attributes of the President it seeks. Such a list will draw both upon the institutional evaluation and the Board's ideas about the future of the institution. The annotations might adequately but briefly explain the various characteristics and attributes. In almost every case such an optimal list may describe a person who does not exist. In any case, the list should be examined for extraneous restrictions as well as for inconsistencies. Extraneous restrictions may work to dampen the interest of eminent prospective candidates, and may even induce a situation in which a new President may be embarrassed or have his own self-confidence eroded. The best available candidate who is a fourth-generation American with a specific religious affiliation and a particular racial identity may be a very bad potential President who would not have been considered for a moment if any or all of these restrictions had been removed. Furthermore, a President appointed under restrictions would always suspect that he had not competed against the best candidates. Possible inconsistencies in the list are difficult to describe in bland generic terms. Experience suggests that they may be recognized rather easily by a cogent examination of the list.

If the optimal list, even after the elimination of extraneous matters and inconsistencies, still describe only non-existent or unavailable potential candidates, it will be necessary to construct a minimal list. In any case, it might be desirable to do this in order to establish a domain of operations for the Search Committee. Candidates whose names arise but who do not meet or surpass the minimal conditions can usually be spotted readily, thus reducing the burden of work of the Board as well as of the Committee. Some items appearing on almost all such lists, optimal as well as minimal, will be related to professional and academic accomplishments, successful executive experience or manifest understanding of administrative principles as they apply to institutions of higher education, assessment of the proper function of higher education in general and of the specific institution in particular, attitudes toward human beings in general and toward college and university students, faculty, and administrators in particular, outlook relative to the future of higher education, view as to the function and responsibility of institutions of higher education vis a vis the entire educational complex, public and private, from nursery schools through the universities, with trade and professional institutions prop-

erly considered, and attitude towards boards of control, generically. There will be other items appropriate to specific institutions, such as public image, fund raising from private and public sources, and specific temporary or permanent problems. Inevitably the question of salary will be broached, so the Board will determine a salary range, narrow or broad, firm or flexible, to which the Presidency of its institution belongs. The National Association of Boards of Trustees can be of assistance in this matter.

In addition, the question of perquisites has to be settled. Almost all Presidencies carry housing for the President's family as a perquisite. Some carry expense accounts not only for entertainment and necessary and vacation travel, but also for some ordinary day to day living expenses, including food, cars and their operation and maintenance, utilities, and some household and personal help. Some include payment of some or all the expenses of educating the President's children in private nursery, elementary, and secondary schools as well as in colleges and universities. The potential list is long. Sometimes the cost to a college or university incurred in the area of perquisites equals or even quite significantly exceeds the salary the President is paid. Both candidates and Boards regard the negotiations preceding a Presidential appointment as an occasion for adjustment of the perquisites. Guidelines are to be considered before the negotiations begin, probably even before a search is initiated.

Presidents are usually appointed to an indefinite term, with formal provision for termination "at the pleasure of the Board". Traditionally, however, Presidents have served up to the customary age of retirement. Even in cases where a Board has wished to replace the President, it has been loathe to do so until such time as a suitable new position, acceptable to him, could be found. (Compare with the Peter Principle, or perhaps more appropriately with the practice of assigning passing grades to failing students.) In recent times, the President's tenure has become so uncertain and occasionally brief that a demand for assured tenure or term contracts has been born. Some institutions whose Boards have granted such demands find themselves having to pay a President's salary and perquisites(!) long after he has left the position, and sometimes even for years after he has taken another job. If Boards do not wish to consider this matter before a search begins, they had best know about its unfortunate possibilities as final negotiations with candidates draw near.

Finally, when these major matters of preparation are completed or are well in hand, then the problem of building and charging a Search Committee is broached.

The Search Committee: Composition and Charge

A committee searching for candidates for any position in an academic institution has an important responsibility whatever the vacancy to be filled. For most such positions the domain of service, authority, and responsibility is more or less restricted because the position is likely to be specialized in concept and function. Thus the constituencies of primary and intensive interest are likely to be rather limited in scope and variety. In the case of the Presidency, however, these constituencies are precisely and wholly the sum total of all of the constituencies of the institution itself. Therefore, the role and responsibility of the Presidential Search Committee will have members representing several if not all the broadly conceived constituencies of the institution, including the Board itself. If a Board representative is to be Chairman of the Committee, it is likely that his task will be more delicate than otherwise. Such a Chairman must exert himself to the end that Board preferences among candidates in no way influence the deliberations or other work of the Committee. If such influences become operative, the value of the Committee and its final report are in jeopardy.

The Board appoints to the Committee only persons who are not active nor prospective candidates for the Presidency.

Also, a realistic search committee budget is drawn up by the Board as a basis for discussion by the Committee at its first meeting. Adjustments are made if required to obtain Committee agreement. Ample provisions are made for communications expense. "Expenditures as required" arrangements generate associated perils of penury and prodigality.

Once constituted, the Committee's first job is to understand its role and responsibility. In this connection it is the Board's job to give it a clearly articulated charge, including the optimal list and the minimal list of characteristics and attributes, an approximate date and nature of the expected final report or other product, and any other matters the Board in its wisdom wishes to include. This charge is drawn up, at least in draft form, prior to appointment of the Search Committee so that prospective Committee members can be given some impression as to the nature and extent of the work involved. Board representatives are available at the first meeting of the committee to formally present, discuss, and answer questions about the formal charge to the Committee.

A firm written agreement or understanding must be reached between the Board and the Committee relative to the handling and disposition of the final list of candidates to be reported to the Board. This

understanding may specify any matters which the two parties agree upon. However, there are a few indispensable interlocking items:

1. Is the Board obligated to offer appointment to at least one person on the list?

2. Is the Board obligated to exhaust the list with offers if its first choice proves unavailable?

3. Can the Board add to the reported list before it begins its own deliberations?

4. Can the Board add to the list during the course of its deliberations?

5. Can the Board set up its own list after exhausting the Committee's list?

6. If the Board exhausts the Committee's list, can it then "sweeten the pot" and appoint a person not on the list?

It might seem that there questions are unimportant, but on their answers depend the true meaning and value of the search concept and the work of the Search Committee. Some Boards consider these and related questions before deciding whether to seek the aid of a Search Committee at all. A Search Committee renders itself vulnerable to a later charge of insanity if it does not insist upon agreement on these and similar matters prior to accepting a charge from the Board. The Board can protect itself from the inadvertent creation or widening of a credibility gap by settling such questions in advance.

The charge to the Committee should also include the instruction that if any of its members becomes an active or prospective candidate for the Presidency, he should promptly resign from the committee. After this briefing meeting, the Board withdraws from participating in Committee matters, except to respond to questions posed by the Committee. Nor must the Committee brook any interference of any kind in its affairs on the part of the Board.

The Search

The terms of the charge will influence all later acts and determine the remaining components of the role and responsibility of the Committee. That is why it is so important for the Board to articulate the charge in the first place and for the Committee to understand it. Those components can usually be classified under the following rubrics:

a) Compile a list of all likely candidates and assemble supporting information, including curricula vitae, evaluations of performance in present position, references from more sources than those suggested by or on behalf of each candidate;

b) Shorten the list by eliminations initiated in the Committee or withdrawals by the candidates. Biographical data appearing in books of the Who's Who type can be of great assistance here. Any kinds of personal contacts between members of the Committee and reliable sources close to candidates will be carefully exploited. Every attempt will be made to determine the few most viable candidates. Once these are chosen, all others are dropped from consideration or placed in a reserve list. No discussion of this procedure nor of its results are engaged in outside the Committee. Confidentiality is essential from this point until the new President is appointed and has accepted the appointment;

c) Ascertain, by direct or indirect contact, whether each remaining candidate has any interest in the position. Frequently this is done by a letter setting forth certain particulars relative to the position. Such a letter draws heavily on the material in the optimal and especially the minimal list of characteristics and attributes. Obtain curricula vitae from those interested; pursue the references listed in these and obtain further evaluable information from other sources, especially from trusted sources close to candidates in their current position.

d) At this point the really difficult portion of the search procedure begins. Unless the list of candidates is rather short, the work of reading, sifting, and evaluating all information from whatever source is a demanding, time consuming task.

Mistakes of collective committee judgment can prove costly, even disastrous. Committee meetings of necessity will provide opportunity not only for collective evaluation of such information but also for in-depth discussion of essential portions of the charge and of the search itself. Divergencies of opinion will assuredly arise to be aired. If properly handled by the Chairman, such divergencies need not lead to counterproductive schisms in the Committee, and may even lead to deeper understanding of the problems and more substantial agreement in support of the final report and recommendations to the Board.

It may be that the Committee will want to approach the Loard or the Executive Committee of the Board for clarification of some points. As pointed out earlier, such an approach is the prerogative of the Search Committee, never that of the Board. It may be that the Committee wishes some sort of direct contact with some or all of the candidates in what will in all probability be a dwindling list. One or two members

of the Committee may be designated to seek interviews with each such candidate. Precise and limited purposes are pre-designated for such interviews and their content must remain within the bounds imposed by such purposes. Such contacts can be valuable, but they can also be unfortunate. Insofar as may be possible, such interviews are to be considered as lying within the exclusive domain of the Board itself.

Usually the Board's charge will have indicated the type of end product expected from the Committee. Such product ordinarily will include a set of three, four, or perhaps even five names for final consideration by the Board. The Committee must endeavor to provide to the Board some freedom of action in its final appointment by including in the list not only the most appropriate candidates but also some diversity. If the candidates whose names appear on the final recommended list are essentially holographic images of one another, then the Board's freedom of choice is severely compromised. In most cases, however, the diversity of human characteristics provides adequate protection against this eventuality without embarrassing the work of the Committee. Just as the Board supports the work of the Committee best by steadfastly refusing to interfere with its proceedings, so the Committee supports the Board by providing a varied short list of eminent candidates from which an appointment can be made.

A note of caution must be sounded at this point. Not infrequently a search is conducted during the temporary administration of an Acting President. Such an administrator may be of such stature that the Board wants him to work as a member of the Committee. This arrangement may be both desirable and productive. Exceptions occur in all cases in which the Acting President either initially or during the process becomes himself a candidate. A clear conflict of interest arises in every case in which an active participant in a search is an overt, covert, or even prospective candidate for the position. There may be some people who can succeed in maintaining strict impartiality in their attitudes and behavior in such a situation. In spite of this, it is too much to ask and expect of any person.

Furthermore, a candidate for appointment must not take part in any aspect or phase of the search or appointment procedure. The situation is markedly different from that in which a candidate for elective public office conducts a political campaign and then goes to the polls to vote for himself. A corollary of this principle is that no member of the Search Committee nor of the Board will be on the final list of candidates passed on to the Board. Even in those cases in which such a member protests against such inclusion, the Board has the responsibility either to reject the report in toto or to delete the name from the list.

The final report attaches all credentials, curriculum vitae, and other materials assembled by the Committee and pertaining to candidates named in the report. Materials for candidates considered by the Committee but not included in the report are preserved secure until they can be returned to the candidates or otherwise disposed of. A candidate may sometimes specify the form of such disposition when he sends a curriculum vitae to the Committee. In some cases it will be desirable to return these immediately after the report list is decided upon. In every case, common courtesy demands that each candidate be informed by letter or more rapid private communication as soon as a definite decision has been reached not to recommend him to the Board for appointment. It is usually unpleasant and disconcerting for an interested active candidate to learn of his elimination, or of the success of his competitors, through the news media.

Board Procedures and Action

The final report is filed with the Board on a schedule which permits its distribution to individual Board members shortly prior to a regular meeting. In some cases a special meeting will be called to consider the report. In any event, Board action on the report must be prompt and expeditious. To facilitate this, some Boards authorize their Executive Committees to carry forward all preliminaries, such as making their own ranking of the report list, setting up and conducting interviews and negotiations of salary, perquisites, authority limitations, conditions of work, date of transfer of authority, and other pertinent matters. Other Boards set up special committees for this purpose. Still others carry out this process in the full Board. Obviously the size and geographical dispersion of the Board will influence the nature of this process, but other considerations also enter the picture. Boards generally exploit the peculiarities of their individual organizational structures and procedures to achieve an optimally effective operation in this respect.

Again a word of caution is in order, even though it warns against a very rare phenomenon. Before making an appointment, the Board must make certain that all the credentials and qualifications of its proposed appointee which appear in its optimal list or minimal list of characteristics and attributes for candidates are genuine. In fact, the presence of any spurious credential, listed or not, is a strongly derogatory if not totally disqualifying element.

Ordinarily and almost without exception, the final action of the Board is taken in plenary public session assembled, and after all agreements have been worked out with the successful candidate and after his acceptance is assured. Usually, but not always, the deliberations

are carried out in secret until this meeting. Sometimes the name of the successful candidate is leaked to or divined by the press beforehand. In recent times, a goodly portion of the later deliberations have been either open to the public or reported to and in the press.

In any case, all matters related to the search are concluded as soon after final Board action as is possible. The Search Committee, if not already out of existence, is formally dissolved, posthaste. Expressions of appreciation for work done by the Committee and for interest and cooperation on the part of candidates are sent by the Board. Any surviving vestiges of credentials and associated materials are either returned to their sources or otherwise appropriately disposed of. The end product is the only surviving assembled evidence that any search ever took place.

There are those who will disagree with this last statement, holding that a list of names and addresses of all candidates considered by the search committee are kept so that sensible responses can be made to inquiries from similar institutions. Even if this opinion is expressed, in whatever quarter, Board action taken on it should be based on a simultaneous consideration of the position set forth in the previous paragraph.

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